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Article 
THERE IS MORE TO FEAR THAN FEAR ITSELF:  
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD’S ATTACK ON PURPOSEFUL AND 
NECESSARY WORKPLACE CONDUCT RULES 
MUST BE STOPPED 
Robert J. Dignam* 
This Article was substantially completed between the fall of 2016 and the 
spring of 2017.  It was inspired by a concern that the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB or Board), while presumably acting with the honorable intention of 
protecting the rights of workers to discuss the terms and conditions of their 
employment, as bestowed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA), through its overzealous policing of workplace conduct rules, was 
actually detracting from an orderly work environment.  This Article pointed out 
that the problem emanated from the NLRB’s ruling in Lutheran Heritage 
Village-Livonia, after which the NLRB regularly predicted that employees 
would interpret seemingly innocuous rules of conduct in such a broad fashion 
that it would inhibit their Section 7 rights. 
As this Article was undergoing final edits, the NLRB, in The Boeing 
Company, expressly overruled Lutheran Heritage.  As explained in The 
Boeing Company, the Board will now evaluate the nature and extent of the 
potential impact of facially neutral policies, rules, or handbook provisions on 
NLRA rights, and whether there are legitimate justifications for such workplace 
rules and regulations.  In contrast to the evaluation undertaken by the Board 
under Lutheran Heritage, the NLRB will now undertake the evaluation 
consistent with the “duty to strike the proper balance between . . . asserted 
business justifications and the invasion of employee rights in light of the Act and 
its policy.” 
While there is now a basis to hope that employers will no longer will be 
subjected to “a misguided belief that unless employers correctly anticipate and 
carve out every possible overlap with NLRA coverage, employees are best served 
by not having employment policies, rules and handbooks,” the immediate concern 
became the continued purpose of this Article, since the recommended change in 
the law has now apparently transpired. 
Upon reflection, however, it became evident that the decision to overturn 
Lutheran Heritage was by way of a 3-2 party line vote, and not the product a 
substantive analysis embraced by the full NLRB concerning the flaw in its 
approach in recent years.  Indeed, for too long, as this Article explains, the NLRB 
has been unique in its denouncement of facially neutral policies and handbook 
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provisions which it deemed per se unlawful, while in many other arenas and legal 
settings, the import of all relevant language and the intent and impact of a policy 
or provision must be taken into consideration. As such, this Article provides a 
detailed discussion of the numerous reasons why prior restraint of an employer’s 
efforts to guide and control its workers must be avoided. The analysis offered in 
this Article should be fully considered when the time comes, under a future 
presidential administration, for a party line vote that could otherwise permit the 
NLRB to resurrect Lutheran Heritage and again impede employers from 
providing a quality working environment, paradoxically in the name of workers’ 
rights as bestowed by Section 7. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1933, the United States Congress passed the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA) which authorized the President of the United States 
to regulate industry and attempt to raise prices to counter severe deflation 
and stimulate the nation’s economic recovery.1  In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, however, the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled that the NIRA, which assigned lawmaking powers to the National 
Recovery Administration (NRA), violated the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution.2  The Supreme Court declared the NIRA to be 
an improper use of congressional power and invalidated the industrial 
“codes of fair competition,” which the NIRA had enabled the President to 
issue.3  The Supreme Court ruled that these codes violated the 
Constitution’s separation of powers because it was an impermissible 
delegation of legislative power to the executive branch.4  The unanimous 
pronouncement by the Supreme Court that the NIRA was 
                                                
* Robert J. Dignam is a partner at O’Neill McFadden and Willett, LLP, in Schererville, 
Indiana, and since 2002, has taught courses in Personnel Law, Human Resources 
Management, and Conflict Management at Purdue University Calumet, which recently 
merged with Purdue University North Central, and is now known as Purdue University 
Northwest.  Special gratitude is extended to Nicholas S. DeMario, who graduated from 
Valparaiso University School of Law in 2017, and served during law school as Associate 
Editor, Valparaiso University Law Review, Volume 51, for communicating this authorship 
opportunity and providing invaluable guidance along the way. 
1 See National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. § 195 (1933) (authorizing the President of 
the United States to regulate industry). 
2 See 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (expressing that the New Deal was to eliminate competition 
and bring industry, labor, and government together); U.S. Const. art.1, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that 
the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have power to regulate 
commerce). 
3 See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 535 (invalidating the Congressional power 
of the NIRA). 
4 See id. at 541–42 (supporting that the Supreme Court’s ruling on the improper use of 
congressional power). 
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unconstitutional served to strike down a main component of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal.5 
Once the Supreme Court adjudged the National Industrial Recovery 
Act unconstitutional, many unions explored potential relief from 
employers who they accused of spying on, interrogating, disciplining, 
discharging, and blacklisting union members.6  Additionally, during the 
1930s: 
workers had begun to organize militantly, and in 1933 
and 1934, a wave of strikes occurred across the nation in 
the form of citywide general strikes and factory 
takeovers. Violent confrontations took place between 
workers attempting to form unions and the police and 
private security forces defending the interests of anti-
union employers.7 
In response to the concerns of organized labor and the Supreme 
Court’s enforcement of the separation of legislative and executive powers 
mandated by the commerce clause, Senator Robert F. Wagner of New 
York, in February 1935, introduced the National Labor Relations Act in 
the Senate.8  The Senate bill included a proposal to create a new 
independent agency, known as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB 
or “The Board”).  The Board would be comprised of three members 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, which would be 
empowered to enforce the rights of employees who made up the 
American workforce.9 
The NLRA became law in July 1935.10  The overarching intention of 
the law, commonly known as the Wagner Act, was to guarantee 
                                                
5 See id. at 550–51 (holding that the code provisions are invalid).  See also William 
Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Domestic Affairs, MILLER CENTER https://miller 
center.org/president/fdroosevelt/domestic-affairs [https://perma.cc/WNH2-JKND] 
(explaining the unemployment crisis during the Great Depression).  When President 
Roosevelt entered office in 1933, he immediately took steps to stabilize the economy, create 
jobs, and provide relief for many Americans who were suffering from the effects of the Great 
Depression.  Id.  Over the next eight years, during President Roosevelt’s administration, the 
federal government initiated numerous projects and programs, known collectively as the 
New Deal.  Id. 
6 National Labor Relations Act (1935), (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.ourdocuments.gov/ 
print_friendly.php?page=&doc=67&title=National+Labor+Relations+Act+%281935%29 
[https://perma.cc/Z55Z-RHB6]. 
7 Id. 
8 See id. (explaining the Wagner Act). 
9 See id. (stating that  the NLRA applied to all employers involved in interstate commerce 
except airlines, railroads, agriculture, and government). 
10 See id. (providing when the NLRA was enacted). 
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employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection.”11 
In President Roosevelt’s inaugural address on March 4, 1933, with the 
country mired in the Great Depression, President Roosevelt assured the 
nation, “[f]irst of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we 
have to fear is fear itself.”12  The pro-labor legislation that followed made 
complete sense in the moment.13  Yet, the interpretation and application 
by the NLRB of the aforementioned key language of the NLRA in recent 
times has created a national landscape in which employers have learned 
that they indeed do have much more to fear than fear itself.14  Well-
intending employers instead must fear the very agency which is designed 
to protect workers and improve the workplace because the NLRB has seen 
fit to construe the language of the NLRA in such a broad fashion that it is 
actually interfering with an employer’s right and duty to issue and enforce 
rules designed to ensure order and civility in the workplace.15 
II.  APPLICABLE LAW 
According to the NLRB, “Congress enacted the National Labor 
Relations Act . . . in 1935 to protect the rights of employees and employers, 
to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain private sector 
labor and management practices, which can harm the general welfare of 
                                                
11 Rights of Employees as to Organization, Collective Bargaining, Etc., 29 U.S.C. § 151–169 
(1935). 
12 “Only Thing We Have to Fear Is Fear Itself”:  FDR’s First Inaugural Address, HISTORY 
MATTERS, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5057/ [https://perma.cc/44YR-ZLZX]. 
13 See Wagner Act, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Wagner-Act 
[https://perma.cc/549Y-GP4W] (explaining the policies enacted in the Wagner Act).  The 
NLRA prohibited employers from engaging in unfair labor practices.  Id.  The legislation also 
barred employers from refusing to bargain with any union that had been certified by the 
NLRB.  Id.  The NLRA was opposed by Republicans and big business, and was challenged 
as an interference with the “freedom of contract” between employers and employees, and an 
unconstitutional intrusion by the federal government into industries that were not directly 
engaged in interstate commerce, which Congress was empowered to regulate under the 
Commerce Clause, Article I, § 8.  Id.  The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, upheld the 
constitutionality of the NLRA in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).  Id. 
14 See Rights Without Remedies:  The Failure of the National Labor Relations Act, ABA SECTION 
OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW (Sept. 10, 2008), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-
annualcle/08/materials/data/papers/153.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ7Z-STGN] 
(explaining that companies have little incentive to respect workers’ rights). 
15 See id. (stating that the Act is ineffective in terms of employers exploiting the labor of 
their employees). 
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workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.”16  This language, contained 
in  Section 7 of the NLRA, has remained intact over the past eighty-two 
years.17 
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an 
employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise 
of the rights guaranteed in Section 157” of the NLRA.18  Many employers 
have now become the subject of decisions in which the NLRB has 
concluded that workplace rules which historically were accepted as 
reasonable and necessary to control workplace behavior constitute an 
infringement on employees’ Section 7 protections, and therefore, 
constitute an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8 of the NLRA.19  
According to the NLRB, among other prohibited employer activities, it is 
an unfair labor practice for an employer to: 
Threaten employees with adverse consequences if they 
engage in protected, concerted activity.  (Activity is 
‘concerted’ if it is engaged in with or on the authority of 
other employees, not solely by and on behalf of the 
employee himself.  It includes circumstances where a 
single employee seeks to initiate, induce, or prepare for 
group action, as well as where an employee brings a 
group complaint to the attention of management.  
Activity is ‘protected’ if it concerns employees’ interests 
as employees.  An employee engaged in otherwise 
protected, concerted activity may lose the Act’s 
protection through misconduct.) Discharge, 
constructively discharge, suspend, layoff, fail to recall 
from layoff, demote, discipline, or take any other adverse 
action against employees because of their protected, 
concerted activities.20 
                                                
16 National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/ 
resources/national-labor-relations-act [https://perma.cc/T5H7-JSHU]. 
17  See Rights of Employees as to Organization, Collective Bargaining, Etc., 29 U.S.C. § 157 
(1935) (“[T]he right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection.”). 
18  Rights of Employees as to Organization, Collective Bargaining, Etc., 29 U.S.C. § 158 
(1935). 
19  See id. (elaborating on the Section 7 protections). 
20 Interfering with Employee Rights, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-
protect/whats-law/employers/interfering-employee-rights-section-7-8a1 
[https://perma.cc/MN54-DRW8]. 
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It should be obvious to employers of all types and sizes, employees 
who work for those employers, and the labor organizations who represent 
union workers that businesses are primarily interested in accomplishing 
the particular purposes for which they exist.21  After all, businesses do not 
materialize for the primary purpose of being employers.22  Rather, the 
founder of a company begins with a reason to go into business and then 
requires human capital to achieve the company’s objectives, whether this 
involves agriculture, construction, education, healthcare, manufacturing, 
mining, retail, transportation, or any other industry.23  As a result, 
businesses become employers of the individuals they need to move them 
toward their organizational goals. 
The vast majority of employers in the United States are not 
unionized.24  The number of union workers in the country has been in 
steady decline for many years.25  In 1983, the United States had 17.7 million 
union workers.26  At that time, 20.1 percent of workers were members of 
a union.27  As of 2013, 14.5 million workers belonged to unions.28  By then, 
the percentage of all workers belonging to a union had fallen to 11.3 
percent.29  According to 2013 data, 35.3 percent of public sector employees 
were unionized, while only 6.7 percent of private sector employees were 
in a union.30  Based on 2015 statistics, the decrease in the percentage of 
employers who are unionized has continued.31 In 2014 and 2015, 11.1 
                                                
21 See Business Planning:  Building an Effective Business Model, KAUFFMEN ENTREPRENEURS 
(May 1, 2002), https://www.entrepreneurship.org/articles/2002/05/business-planning-
building-an-effective-business-model [https://perma.cc/US8M-NVMC] (explaining the 
business planning process and reaching objectives). 
22 See id. (describing the purpose of a business plan). 
23 See id. (explaining the importance of choosing your business team to get the objectives 
and vision that one wishes to reach). 
24 See Union Membership in The United States, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS (Sept. 1, 2016), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/9LZG-HS6U] 
(illustrating the decline of the unionized workforce in the United States). 
25 See id. (elaborating on the percentage of decline in union workers). 
26 Union Members Summary, BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/38BT-NLBN]. 
27 See id. (stating that there was 20.1 percent of workers in a union in 1983). 
28 See Union Members–2013, BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS (Jan. 24, 2014), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01242014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
C9KD-R53G] (describing the statistic of those that belonged to unions in 2013). 
29 See id. (expressing the percentage of workers who belong to unions and expressing that 
this number has dropped). 
30 See id. (providing that some individuals who have considered the question have opined 
that the decline in the number of union workers has resulted in the NLRB’s increased 
vigilance about work rules of organized and non-union workplaces, also that the inspiration 
for the NLRB’s activities is not the focus of this article, as the cause is likely multi-factoral). 
31 See Union Members Summary, supra note 26 (showing the decrease in the amount of 
union workers). 
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percent of wage by hour and salaried workers were union members.32  The 
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics also indicated that 14.8 million 
wage by hour and salaried workers belonged to unions in 2015, which was 
again the same as in 2014.33  By January 26, 2017, the Bureau reported that 
the percentage of unionized wage by hour and salaried workers had 
decreased to 10.7 percent, which constituted a decrease of 0.4 percent from 
the previous year.34 
The law permits private sector employers that are not unionized to 
interact with the workforce on an at-will basis.35  The at-will employment 
doctrine is consistent among the states.36  In simplest terms, the 
relationship is terminable at the will of either party.37  For instance, in Orr 
v. Westminster Village North, Inc., the Supreme Court of Indiana explained: 
Historically, Indiana has recognized two basic forms of 
employment: (1) employment for a definite or 
ascertainable term; and (2) employment at-will.  If there 
is an employment contract for a definite term, and the 
employer has not reserved the right to terminate the 
employment before the conclusion of the contract, the 
employer generally may not terminate the employment 
relationship before the end of the specified term except 
for cause or by mutual agreement.  If there is no definite 
or ascertainable term of employment, then the 
employment is at-will, and is presumptively terminable 
at any time, with or without cause, by either party.38 
The Orr court further provided:   
The employment-at-will doctrine is a rule of contract 
construction, not a rule imposing substantive limitations 
                                                
32 See Union Membership (Annual) News Release, BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS (Jan. 28, 2016), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01282016.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
BY77-3UC9] (showing that union membership had steadied from 2014 and 2015). 
33  See id. (expressing the similar union member numbers from 2014 and 2015). 
34 See Union Members Summary, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/38BT-NLBN] 
(addressing the 0.4 percent decline of union worker memberships). 
35 See Charles Muhl, The Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, BUREAU OF 
LAB. STATISTICS (Jan. 2001), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/art1full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HS92-D8JZ] (explaining that at-will employees are terminable by either 
the employee or the employer). 
36  See id. (showing a chart representing the states that use the at-will employment 
doctrine). 
37 See id. (defining the employment-at-will doctrine). 
38  689 N.E.2d 712, 717 (Ind. 1997). 
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on the parties’ freedom to contract.  If the parties choose 
to include a clear job security provision in an employment 
contract, the presumption that the employment is at-will 
may be rebutted.39 
The Orr opinion confirmed that, in Indiana, similar to other states, 
employers and employees have the right to agree to the terms and 
conditions of the employment relationship, including its duration; and in 
the absence of any clear intention to deviate from the norm, such 
employment relationships will be deemed at-will.40 
Most employment lawyers are familiar with the concept, as stated by 
the National Conference of State Legislatures, that “at-will means that an 
employer can terminate an employee at any time for any reason, except 
an illegal one, or for no reason without incurring legal liability.  Likewise, 
an employee is free to leave a job at any time for any or no reason with no 
adverse legal consequences.”41  Of course, many local, state, and federal 
laws with which employers must comply must still be considered in an at-
will employment relationship and when bringing the relationship to a 
conclusion.42  Otherwise, consistent with the understanding that courts 
                                                
39  Id. (citations omitted). 
40 See McClanahan v. Remington Fright Lines, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 390, 392 (Ind. 1988) 
(providing some history about at-will employment).  The Supreme Court of Indiana stated: 
Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, an employer was responsible for 
his servant’s health, welfare and security.  The ‘English rule’ stated that 
hiring for an unspecified term was presumed to be for at least a year and 
the employer was required to give a ‘quarter’s warning’ before 
discharging an employee  who sought continued employment. By 
the mid-nineteenth century, however, ‘emerging notions of the freedom 
of contract and of the value of economic growth contributed to the 
evolution of the at-will doctrine . . . . ’ The ‘American rule’ rejected the 
presumption of a yearly hiring and required the employee to bear the 
burden of proving that employment was for other than an indefinite 
term . . . The American employment-at-will doctrine gained strength 
and reached its peak by the beginning of the twentieth century.  At that 
time, the employer’s right to discharge at his whim was virtually 
absolute.  With the advent of federal and state legislation, collective 
bargaining, and employment contracts, the vitality of that rule has 
dwindled.  The essence of the modern rule is that an employment 
contract of indefinite duration is presumptively terminable at the will of 
either party. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
41 The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, NAT’L CONF. FOR STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6YSW-PPA8]. 
42 See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200e (2017); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1988 
(2017); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001et seq (2017); 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 2008, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq (2017); Americans with 
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will normally not interfere with the affairs of business, cases such as Thayer 
v. Vaughan, all repeat the common theme that a court will “not sit as a 
super-personnel department that re-examines an entity’s business 
decisions . . . .”43  The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit has made the same proclamation.44 
Some employers become unionized, in whole or in part, at which 
point the employment relationship for the unionized workers is largely 
controlled by the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining 
agreement.  A collective bargaining agreement, or CBA, is negotiated 
between the labor union which represents the workers and the employer. 
The CBA establishes the terms and conditions of employment for workers 
in the bargaining unit, and typically includes provisions addressing 
wages, vacation time, working hours, working conditions, and health 
insurance benefits.45  Of course, a CBA invariably will not address every 
                                                
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2017); Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act of 2008, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 et seq (2017); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. § 701 et seq (2017); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et 
seq (2017); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1975, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq (2017); 
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, 29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq (2017); Exec. Order No. 
11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965); Workers Adjustment and Retraining Act of 1974, 
29 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq (2017); Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et 
seq (2017); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2017); Vietnam Era Veteran’s 
Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 4212 (2017); National Labor Relations Act 
of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2017); National Labor Relations Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et 
seq (2017); Indiana Age Discrimination Act, IND. CODE. ANN. § 22-9-2-1 et seq (West 2017) 
(providing standards for age discrimination in Indiana); Indiana Civil Rights Law, Ind. Code 
Ann. § 22-9-1-1 et seq (West 2017) (establishing Indiana’s civil rights laws); Indiana 
Minimum Wage Law, IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-2-1 et seq (West 2017); Indiana Employment 
Discrimination Against Disabled Persons Act, IND. CODE. ANN. § 22-9-5-1 et seq (West 2017) 
(prohibiting disability discrimination in Indiana); IND. CODE. ANN. § 22-2-5-1 et seq (West 
2017) (providing labor safety standards in Indiana); Indiana Family Military Leave Law, Ind. 
Code Ann. § 22-2-13-11 et seq (West 2017) (establishing leave for military families); Indiana 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, IND. CODE. ANN. § 22-8-1-1 et seq (West 2017) (outlining 
Indiana’s version of occupational health and safety standards); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-6-1 
(West 2017) (establishing HIV screening in Indiana); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-8-1 et seq (West 
2017) (describing confidentiality of health information); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-4-1 et seq 
(West 2017) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of tobacco use). 
43 Thayer v. Vaughan, 801 N.E.2d 647, 650–651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).  
44 See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 862 (7th Cir. 2012) (“In adjudicating claims under 
federal employment discrimination statutes, a court does not sit as a ‘super-personnel 
department,’ second-guessing an employer’s ‘business decision as to whether someone 
should be fired or disciplined because of a work-rule violation.’”).  See also Hiatt v. Rockwell 
Int’l Corp, 26 F.3d 761, 772 n.13 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that company disciplinary policies 
and procedures that are worked out between the company and union are not reviewable by 
the court). 
45  Your Rights: All About Unions, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, 
https://www.workplacefairness.org/labor-unions#5 [https://perma.cc/3EKM-S89H].  
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issue that arises during the term of the agreement.46  The “management 
rights” clause in a CBA typically empowers the company to exercise its 
judgment and manage the workforce in the absence of an applicable 
provision in the agreement.47  Matters concerning terms and conditions of 
employment, however, that are included in the CBA usually must be 
negotiated before changes can be made, although some CBAs allow 
management to unilaterally alter certain terms and conditions of 
employment during the term of the agreement through the management 
rights clause.48  Through such a clause, the union essentially waives the 
right to bargain over certain issues.49  Put another way, the management 
rights clause establishes the issues the parties have agreed to leave to the 
employer’s discretion.50 
Recently, however, the NLRB has signified that it will employ a 
heightened standard when assessing whether a union has waived the 
right to bargain over certain terms and conditions of employment in a 
management rights clause by requiring a new degree of specificity in the 
CBA before an employer can make unilateral changes.  In Graymont PA, 
Inc., a three-member majority of the Board, with one member dissenting, 
decided that an employer violated the NLRA by not giving the union an 
adequate opportunity to bargain before it changed its existing policies.51  
Based on this recent decision, it is apparent that management rights 
clauses will need to be more specific to pass muster with the NLRB.52 
                                                
46 See Employer/Union Rights and Obligations, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/employerunion-rights-and-obligations 
[https://perma.cc/3N9L-NHNS] (discussing rights and obligations between employers and 
unions regarding collective bargaining agreements). 
47 See 39A OHIO JUR. 3D Management rights clauses of collective bargaining agreements with 
private employers § 516, Westlaw (last visited Aug. 23, 2017) (defining management rights 
clauses and how they work).  
48 See Management Rights Clauses Spell Out Employer Autonomy in Collective Bargaining 
Agreements, OHIO STATE BAR ASS’N, https://www.ohiobar.org/ForPublic/Resources/ 
LawYouCanUse/Pages/LawYouCanUse-663.aspx [https://perma.cc/RXC8-ZQNE] 
(discussing which subjects must be negotiated between employers and unions). 
49  See generally 39A OHIO JUR. 3D Management rights clauses of collective bargaining 
agreements with private employers § 516, Westlaw (last visited Aug. 23, 2017) (stating the 
function of management rights clauses in collective bargaining agreements between private 
employers and labor unions).  
50  See id. (outlining the purpose and functions of management rights clauses in collective 
bargaining agreements between private employer and labor union). 
51 See Graymont PA, Inc., 364 NLRB. No. 37 (June 29, 2016) (holding that the employer to 
be in violation of the National Labor Relations Act). 
52 See Who We Are, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-
are/board [https://perma.cc/6WLH-HHXN] (introducing the composition of the board 
and how it acts in an adjudicative manner and The Board consists of “five Members which 
serves in a quasi-judicial body, deciding cases based on formal records in administrative 
proceedings”).  “The President appoints Board members to five-year terms, with Senate 
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consent, with the term of one member expiring each year.” Id.  Nat’l Labor Relations Board v. 
Noel Canning, Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-1281 [https://perma.cc/8DF7-
5QKF] (discussing the NLRB complaint initiation and adjudication processes and that the 
NLRA empower the Board to decide labor disputes among employers, unions, and 
employees.).  Once an unfair labor practice charge is filed with a Regional Office, it conducts 
an investigation and, if necessary, files a complaint.  Id.  An Administrative Law Judge 
(“ALJ”) presides over a hearing to consider the charge and issues a recommendation to the 
Board.  Id.  The ALJ’s recommendation becomes the final order of the Board unless a party 
timely appeals to the Board.  Id.  The Board is required to have at least three of its five 
members present.  Id.  The number of Board members has occasionally generated 
controversy, because the requisite number of members has not always been in place.  Id.  The 
NLRA permits parties to appeal a Board ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals in the Circuit 
where the unfair labor practice is alleged to have occurred or to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia.  Noel Canning, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/ 
12/1281 [https://perma.cc/8DF7-5QKF] (analyzing that the NLRA allows parties to appeal 
a Board ruling to the relevant federal court).  See NLRB. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 
(2014), Justice Stephen Breyer authored an unanimous opinion by which the Supreme Court 
unanimously rejected the specific exercises of the power to make recess appointments. The 
Supreme Court, however, by a 5-4 vote, rejected the rationale offered by the D.C. Circuit 
concerning the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause.  Id. at 2578.  The majority 
instead considered the Framing-era history and subsequent executive branch application of 
the clause and concluded that recess appointments are allowed during intra-session recesses 
that last 10 days or longer, as well as appointments to fill vacancies that existed prior to the 
recess.  Id. at 2567 (explaining that the Court looked to the Framing-era history and 
application of the clause in question).  Justice Breyer, addressing the structural purpose of 
the clause, noted that the “Framers included the Recess Appointments Clause to preserve 
the ‘vigour of government’ at times when an important organ of Government, the United 
States Senate, is in recess.”  Id. at 2577.  The Supreme Court then affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s 
ruling because the Senate’s use of pro forma sessions rendered the recess of insufficient 
length to permit recess appointments.  Id. at 2578.  The concurring opinion authored by 
Justice Antonin Scalia and joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justices Anthony Alito, 
Jr., and Clarence Thomas, clarifies that the President should only be permitted to make recess 
appointments during inter-session recesses and only to fill vacancies that arose during that 
recess.  Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2592 (opining that the President should be permitted to 
make recess appointments only during inter-session recesses and only to fill vacancies that 
arose during the recess).  The decision in NLRB vs. Noel Canning (a Pepsi-Cola distributor) 
resulted in the invalidation of over 100 decisions issued by the Board while the contested 
members were in place, including the labor dispute with a Pepsi-Cola distributor that 
initiated the case.  See Sara Goldsmith Schwartz, Supreme Court Invalidates Hundreds of NLRB 
Rulings, SCHWARTZ HANNUM PC (Sept. 2014), http://www.shpclaw.com/Schwartz-
Resources/supreme-court-invalidates-hundreds-of-nlrb-rulings?p=11399 
[https://perma.cc/B6GY-MCSN].  One of the invalidated decisions was Costco Wholesale 
Club, 358 NLRB. 1100 (Sept. 7, 2012), in which the Board concluded that an employer’s 
electronic communication policy that prohibited electronic postings that “damage the 
Company, defame any individual or damage any person’s reputation” unlawfully restricted 
employee rights.  The rationale for the NLRB’s decision, which has not been invalidated 
based upon an unconstitutionally constituted Board in many other cases, is exactly the type 
of reasoning which employers continue to fear, and which is the subject of this article.  Id.  
The nomination by President Donald Trump on January 20, 2017, his first day in office, of 
Andrew Pudzer to become the next Secretary of the Department of Labor appeared to signify 
a shift toward a more employer-friendly period of federal regulation.  See Trey Kovacs, Here’s 
why Trump’s Labor pick Andy Pudzer, will help grow the economy and create jobs, FOX NEWS (Feb. 
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Employers of union workers naturally understand that because they 
employ organized labor, they are under the jurisdiction of the NLRB.53  
Yet, many private sector non-union employers have been surprised to 
learn that even though they do not have a unionized workforce, they are 
within the jurisdiction of the NLRB and are subject to the NLRA.54  A 
                                                
15, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/02/15/heres-why-trumps-labor-pick-
andy-puzder-will-help-grow-economy-and-create-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/82K6-
X22W].  At the time of his nomination, Mr. Pudzer served as the chief executive officer of CK 
Restaurants, the company that franchises Hardee’s and Carl Jr.’s, and other fast-food 
establishments.  Id.  According to the Employment Policies Institute, a recent survey 
conducted by the survey research firm CorCom Inc., which used “data obtained from CKE 
franchisees representing over 300 stores around the country to complete 242 telephone 
interviews with employees between January 6 and January 9 of this year,” confirmed that 
over 90 percent of employees of Carl’s Jr. and Hardee’s who participated confirmed that they 
felt “safe and respected” in their work environment, including 93 percent of female 
employees.  Id.  In addition, 92 percent of the workers surveyed agreed that “Carl’s Jr. and 
Hardee’s are great places to work.”  Id.  This survey appears to confirm that business leaders 
understand the need to treat the workforce well, which should allay the need for 
hypervigilance by the NLRB based upon an unfounded presumption that Section 7 rights 
are in jeopardy.  Id.  On February 15, 2017, however, Mr. Pudzer withdrew his name from 
consideration because it became evident that he would not garner enough votes in the Senate 
to be confirmed.  See Manu Raju, Dan Merica, Andrew Pudzer withdraws as a labor secretary 
nominee, CNN (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/15/politics/top-senate-
republicans-urge-white-house-to-withdraw-puzder-nomination/ 
[https://perma.cc/2NDU-SE29].  The following day, President Trump nominated R. 
Alexander Acosta, dean of the Florida International University College of Law, to be the next 
Secretary of the Department of Labor.  See Robert Iafola, Steve Holland, Trump Taps Ex-Labor 
Board Member Acosta to Be Labor Secretary, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 16, 2017), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2017-02-16/trump-to-name-ex-labor-
board-member-acosta-as-labor-secretary [https://perma.cc/YNU4-ZR98].  Mr. Acosta 
served as member of the NLRB from December 17, 2002 until August 21, 2003, and has signed 
hundreds of Board opinions.  Members of the NLRB since 1935, NAT. LAB. REL. BD. 
https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/members-nlrb-1935 [https://perma.cc/4U82-
QFK5] (listing the members of the NLRB since 1935, which seat each member held, the party 
in control of the Board, and the terms served by each member).  Mr. Acosta’s nomination 
was confirmed on April 27, 2017.  His background had already been explored prior to his 
service as United Stated Attorney for the Southern District of Florida and his appointment 
by President George W. Bush as Assistant Attorney General in the Justice Department’s Civil 
Rights Division. Accordingly, the change in the NLRB’s analysis which is recommended in 
this article may not be imminent.  Id.  On the other hand, the Senate’s 49–46 vote on 
November 8, 2017, to install Vermont labor lawyer Peter Robb as the NLRB’s new Counsel, 
replacing former labor lawyer Richard Griffin, who served from November 2013 through 
October 2017 (board official and lawyer Jennifer Abruzzo has been serving as Acting General 
Counsel in the interim), suggests that change is in the air.    
53 See Jurisdictional Standards, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-
protect/jurisdictional-standards [https://perma.cc/4U82-QFK5] (explaining the 
jurisdiction of the NLRB and standards for falling under the Board’s jurisdiction for several 
categories of private employers). 
54 See id. (showing that private employers who do not employ union workers may still be 
subject to the NLRB’s jurisdiction). 
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private sector employer, even when not employing union workers, is 
subject to the NLRB’s statutory jurisdiction when its activity exceeds a 
minimal level of interstate commerce.55  Over the years, the NLRB has 
established the standards for asserting jurisdiction.56  As a practical 
matter, the NLRB’s jurisdiction is very broad and covers the great majority 
of non-government employers with a workplace in the United States, 
including non-profit organizations, employee-owned businesses, labor 
organizations, non-union businesses, and businesses in states, such as 
Indiana, with “Right to Work” laws.57  This means that even in non-union 
workforces, the NLRB possesses the authority to review the employer’s 
workplace conduct rules and policies, and may, through an exceedingly 
broad construction of the language contained in those rules and policies, 
require the employer to publicly repudiate the rules and policies and 
promise to refrain from using such rules in the future.58  
The NLRB bases its authority for such encroachments on employer’s 
management of its workforce on the language of Section 7 of the NLRA.59  
The leading case in this area is Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia.60  In this 
case, the NLRB reaffirmed that a rule or policy violates Section 7 of the 
NLRA, known as the workers’ “Bill of Rights,” if the language “reasonably 
tends to chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.”61  In 
                                                
55 See id. (describing that private employers that employ non-union workers can still be 
subject to NLRB jurisdiction if their interstate commerce reaches a certain level). 
56 See id. (defining the jurisdictional standards for several categories of private employers 
such as retailers, non-retailers, and other special categories).  
57 See generally id. (expounding what employers are exempt from the NLRB’s jurisdiction 
by statute or regulation). 
58 See Interfering with employee rights, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-
we-protect/whats-law/employers/interfering-employee-rights-section-7-8a1 
[https://perma.cc/W52G-YEZK] (explaining that employers are prohibited from creating 
and enforcing rules that prevent employees from exercising their rights under the National 
Labor Relations Act); David P. Phippen, Can Your Employment Policies Survive the NLRB?, 
COSTANGY, BROOKS, SMITH & PROPHETE LLP, http://www.constangy.com/ 
communications-500.html [https://perma.cc/68HU-CJDY] (evaluating the NLRB’s 
expansive policy of construing the language of employer rules and policies against the 
employer and finding them to be an unlawful encroachment of employees’ Section 7 rights 
under the NLRA). 
59 See National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/ 
resources/national-labor-relations-act [https://perma.cc/5KWX-VLD4] (stating the text of 
the NLRA, which provides the Board’s authority to investigate complaints and preside over 
cases brought before it). 
60 See Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc., 343 NLRB 646, 646 (2004) (“[A]n employer violates 
Section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a work rule that reasonably tends to chill employees in the 
exercise of their Section 7 rights”).  See also Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998) 
(explaining that the Board may find a work place rule to violate Section 8(a)(1) if it reasonably 
tends to chill employees’ exercising of their Section 7 rights, even if the rule is not enforced). 
61  Id. at 646. 
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arriving at its determination, the NLRB employed a two-step inquiry, as 
follows: 
First, a rule is unlawful if it explicitly restricts activities 
that Section 7 of the NLRA protects. Second, a rule is also 
unlawful “[i]f the rule does not explicitly restrict activity 
protected by Section 7,” but “(1) employees would 
reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 
activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to 
union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict 
the exercise of Section 7 rights.”62 
This standard, which renders a rule or policy unlawful based upon what 
an employee would “reasonably construe” to be an infringement on 
Section 7 activity, is precisely where the problem lies.63  A standard which 
bases the lawfulness of a rule on how the person to which it applies would 
interpret the rule, without regard for the employer’s intent, invites a “tail 
wags the dog” scenario where reasonable and necessary rules of conduct 
are outlawed by a purported “reasonable” interpretation by a worker (or 
the Board member in his or her stead).64  To make matters worse, the 
Board’s conclusions about what language is unlawful are based upon 
tortured interpretations with which no objectively reasonable employer 
could agree.65 
The Lutheran Heritage case does indicate that in conducting this 
inquiry, the NLRB “must refrain from reading particular phrases in 
isolation, and it must not presume improper interference with employee 
rights.”66  Despite that assurance, however, as will be shown in this article, 
the professed presumption of a rule’s lawfulness does not appear to have 
                                                
62 Id. at 647. 
63 Id. 
64 See The meaning and origin of the expression: The tail wagging the dog, THE PHRASE FINDER, 
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/341850.html [https://perma.cc/FRZ9-KT7Q] 
(defining and discussing the phrase “the tail wagging the dog” as something of minor 
importance controlling a situation). This expression, which signifies that the subordinate 
individual or entity actually controls, is thought to have originated in the United States and 
there are many references to this quote in American publications beginning in the 1870s.  Id.  
Perhaps the earliest use is from The Daily Republican, in April 1872:  “Calling to mind Lord 
Dundreary’s conundrum, the Baltimore American thinks that for the Cincinnati Convention 
to control the Democratic party would be the tail wagging the dog.”  Dundreary is a character 
in the play, Our American Cousin.  Id. 
65 See, e.g., Martin Luther Mem’l Home, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 646 (2004) (providing the 
standard and interpretation for finding what language Section 7 of the NLRA prohibits in 
work place rules). 
66 Id. at 646. 
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been consistently applied during the NLRB’s analyses.67  Due to the 
NLRB’s expanded application of Section 7, many unions have been 
inspired to file unfair labor practice charges against the nation’s 
employers, with unfortunate results for companies that desire order and 
decorum, with no intent to violate their workers’ “Bill of Rights.” 68  In this 
regard, the NLRB has gone too far because its zealous enforcement efforts 
are:  1) interfering with the operation of employer’s ability to control its 
workforce, which is necessary for it to accomplish its intended purpose, 
and 2) in actuality, negatively affecting many of the workers it believes it 
is attempting to protect.69 
III.  THE PURPOSE OF WORK PLACE RULES 
Knowledgeable business leaders and company managers are familiar 
with the concepts espoused by Frederick I. Herzberg in his motivation and 
hygiene factors.70  The Motivation to Work was authored by Herzberg with 
                                                
67 See infra Part IV (discussing cases where the NLRB has construed the language of work 
place rules). 
68 See Carl Horowitz, NLRB Sides with Unions in Targeting Employee Handbooks, NAT’L 
LEGAL AND POL’Y CENTER (Mar. 10, 2016), http://nlpc.org/2016/03/10/nlrb-sides-unions-
targeting-employee-handbooks/ [https://perma.cc/UF42-2RTQ] (discussing the NLRB’s 
party composition during presidential terms). Customarily, three Board members belong to 
the political party of the United States President, while the other two belong to opposing 
party.  Id.  Accordingly, during President Barack Obama’s terms, there was a 3–2 Democratic 
majority, given a full board.  Id.  This political advantage appears to have been enhanced by 
opinions issued by the Office of General Counsel, first headed by the Acting General 
Counsel, Lafe Solomon, and more recently by Richard Griffin, whose background includes 
serving as a lawyer for the International Union of Operating Engineers and then an NLRB 
board member before becoming General Counsel.  Id.  Labor organizations have certainly 
recognized this as a prime opportunity to require numerous employers to justify 
employment-related rules and policies.  Id.  On January 26, 2017, President Trump appointed 
current board member Philip A. Miscimarra as Acting Chairman.  See Ted Goodman, Trump 
Names Acting Chairman For National Labor Relations Board, DAILY CALLER (Jan. 26, 2017, 4:51 
PM), http://dailycaller.com/2017/01/26/trump-names-acting-chairman-for-national-
labor-relations-board/ [https://perma.cc/25CM-PK6J].  In response, Mr. Miscimarra 
proclaimed, “I remain committed to the task that Congress has assigned to the Board, which 
is to foster stability and to apply the National Labor Relations Act in an even-handed manner 
that serves the interests of employees, employers and unions throughout the country.”  Id. 
69 See infra Part IV (analyzing cases where the NLRB has construed the language of work 
place rules). 
70 See, e.g., Frederick Herzberg Motivational Theory, BUSINESSBALLS.COM, 
http://www.businessballs.com/herzberg.htm [https://perma.cc/L99R-6XLW] (providing 
a brief background of Frederick Herzberg’s background).  Further: 
Frederick I. Herzberg (1923–2000), clinical psychologist and pioneer of 
‘job enrichment’, is regarded as one of the great original thinkers in 
management and motivational theory.  Herzberg was born in 
Massachusetts on April 18, 1923.  His undergraduate work was at the 
City College of New York, followed by graduate degrees at the 
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two research colleagues in 1959.71  This seminal work established valuable 
theories about motivation in the workplace.  Herzberg’s study, which 
included a survey of 200 Pittsburgh engineers and accountants, “remains 
a fundamentally important reference in motivational study.”72  According 
to Herzberg’s hygiene-motivation theory, dissatisfied workers are 
primarily concerned about the conditions of their work environment.73  
Hygiene (or maintenance) factors, such as the employer’s policies and 
administration, proper supervision, and working conditions, are 
necessary, and the absence of these factors can adversely affect an 
employee’s productivity and motivation.74  Yet, Herzberg was not as 
concerned about motivation as he was about the basic dignity to which 
each employee is entitled to enjoy.75   
In addition to Herzberg’s sound theory, the efforts of Abraham 
Maslow apply to this discussion as well.  Maslow, an American 
psychologist, is best known for creating his famous Maslow’s Hierarchy of 
Needs.76  According to Maslow, before a worker can be expected to pursue 
an organization’s goals, that individual’s  basic needs must first be 
satisfied.77  As a consequence, the individual will first need to fulfill 
                                                
University of Pittsburgh.  Herzberg was later Professor of Management 
at Case Western Reserve University, where he established the 
Department of Industrial Mental Health.  He moved to the University 
of Utah’s College of Business in 1972, where he was also Professor of 
Management.  He died at Salt Lake City, January 18, 2000.   
Id. 
71 See FREDERICK HERZBERG, THE MOTIVATION TO WORK (1959) (expounding Herzberg’s 
theories on motivation in the workplace).  
72 See Frederick Herzberg Motivational Theory, supra note 70 (opining that Herzberg’s survey 
is a key theory in what motivates employees in the work place). 
73 See CLIFF GOODWIN & DAN GRIFFITH, THE CONFLICT SURVIVAL KIT, TOOLS FOR 
RESOLVING CONFLICT AT WORK 17 (describing Herzberg’s theory of hygiene-motivation). 
74 Id. 
75 See Frederick Herzberg Motivational Theory, supra note 70 (explaining Herzberg’s intent in 
creating his workplace motivation theories).  Moreover: 
Although Herzberg is most noted for his famous ‘hygiene’ and 
motivational factors theory, he was essentially concerned with people’s 
well-being at work.  Underpinning his theories and academic teachings, 
he was basically attempting to bring more humanity and caring into the 
workplace.  He and others like him, did not develop their theories to be 
used as ‘motivational tools’ purely to improve organisational 
performance.  They sought instead primarily to explain how to manage 
people properly, for the good of all people at work. 
Id. 
76 See Saul McLeod, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, SIMPLY PSYCHOLOGY (2016), 
https://www.simplypsychology.org/maslow.html [https://perma.cc/6P3K-7PNS] 
(discussing Maslow’s theory of the hierarchy of human needs). 
77 See id. (stating that Maslow’s theory proposes that humans must first meet their most 
basic needs before continuing along the hierarchy). 
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physiological (or survival) needs.78  In any setting, including the 
workplace where American workers often are expected to spend an 
inordinate part of their adult lives, the most basic human needs are for 
safety, security, and acceptance.79  When an employee is unable to fulfill 
these physiological needs in the workplace, conditions are conducive to 
the eruption of conflict.80 
These well-recognized concepts espoused by Herzberg and Maslow 
underscore that an employee cannot be in a position to accomplish the 
employer’s objectives until that individual feels safe and secure in the 
environment.81  This feeling of safety and security is accomplished, as 
Herzberg has demonstrated, through an employer’s use of clear rules and 
policies so that the employee understands what is to be expected, and 
through proper supervision of the workforce to assure that the rules and 
policies are administered in a fair and consistent manner.82  This concept 
is akin to the substantive due process to which citizens are entitled in their 
dealings with the government.83  After all, an individual is entitled to 
know that something is either expected or prohibited before being 
sanctioned for the violation. 
The works of Herzberg and Maslow have carried over into labor and 
employment law.84  One entity which recognizes the right of an employee 
to know that particular conduct is prohibited before a consequence comes 
to bear is the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (IDWD).85  
The IDWD processes claims for unemployment benefits filed in the state 
of Indiana. Eligible employees are entitled to receive temporary income 
through Indiana’s unemployment insurance program managed by the 
IDWD.86  This agency’s stated mission is to “develop [] a premier 
                                                
78 See id. (explaining that Maslow’s theory states that humans must first satisfy 
physiological needs). 
79 See GOODWIN & GRIFFITH, supra note 73, at 17 (providing that safety, security, and 
acceptance are two of a person’s most basic human needs). 
80 See id. (addressing when a work environment is vulnerable to the development of 
conflict).  
81 See id. at 17–18 (discussing contributions to modern employment psychology). 
82 See id. (noting that employees have certain psychological wants within employment). 
83  See Due Process, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) Westlaw (database updated 
2014) (“[t]he conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and principles for 
the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair 
hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case”). 
84  See GOODWIN & GRIFFITH, supra note 73, at 17–18 (noting the need for rule enforcement 
to maintain a happy work environment). 
85 See UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CLAIMANT HANDBOOK 23–4 (Ind. Dep’t of Workforce 
Development) (2017), http://www.in.gov/dwd/2334.htm [https://perma.cc/3WHU-
8KRC] (showing the process and appeals for garnering unemployment benefits). 
86 See Indiana Unemployment Information–Benefits, Eligibility etc., 
ABOUTUNEMPLOYMENT.ORG (Mar. 2017), http://aboutunemployment.org/indiana-
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workforce that will allow Indiana employers to flourish and entice 
businesses from outside the state to relocate to Indiana.”87  To meet 
eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits, a claimant cannot be 
unemployed through his or her own fault.88  In other words, a claimant is 
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if there was just cause 
for the termination.89  The term ‘just cause’ is defined in Indiana Code § 22-
4-15-1(d).90  
In accordance with this statutory scheme, when an unemployment 
benefits claim is made, an employer has the option to protest the benefits, 
and will be inclined to do so if the employee deserved the termination 
                                                
unemployment/ [https://perma.cc/5KV3-LFVH] (discussing processes for the role of 
unemployment insurance). 
87  See Mission, Goals, and Overall Strategy, IND. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV. (2017), 
https://www.in.gov/dwd/2338.htm [https://perma.cc/54AH-XSP9] (reporting IDWD’s 
mission statement). 
88 See Unemployment-Individuals, IND. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV. (2017), 
http://www.in.gov/dwd/2334.htm [https://perma.cc/3WHU-8KRC] (showing that an 
employee must not be unemployed due to personal fault). 
89 See City of Carmel v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 970 N.E.2d 239, 
242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (elaborating on the former burden of proof for unemployment 
benefits claims in Indiana).  The unemployment insurance program is administered by the 
IDWD deputy, and the party that loses initially may appeal to an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) who works for the IDWD.  Id.  The ALJ conducts an administrative hearing, receives 
evidence, and decides whether to affirm or reverse the initial ruling.  Id.  Here, the former 
rule dictates that if an employer believed it possessed just cause to fire the worker, then the 
employer had the burden to prove this.  Id.  See also Pub. L. No. 121-2014 (H.E.A. 1083) (West) 
(amending the former structure of burden of proofs by adding statutory language law to 
Indiana Code 22-4-1-2(c) which now provides that “an applicant’s entitlement to 
unemployment benefits is determined based on the information that is available without 
regard to burden of proof. . . . There is no equitable or common law allowance for or denial 
of unemployment benefits.”).  This amendment to the statute affords the ALJ more discretion 
to make determinations on a case-by-case basis.  Id.  But see Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges v. 
Colvin, 777 F.3d 402, 403–05 (7th Cir. 2015) (expounding that this amendment to the statute 
affords the ALJ more discretion make determinations on a case-by-case basis).  The 
Honorable Richard Posner compared ALJs to workers on “a poultry processing assembly 
line” in rejecting their claim that high caseloads interfere with their decisional independence.  
Id.  The union for the ALJs, the Association of Administrative Law Judges, once sued Social 
Security Administration’s acting commissioner, Carolyn Colvin, in her official capacity 
concerning a policy setting a goal of 500 to 700 “legally sufficient judgments” per judge, per 
year.  Id.  In rejecting the Association’s concerns, Judge Posner drew a parallel between the 
ALJs and a poultry processing worker whose assembly line is speeded up.  Id.  According to 
Judge Posner, work quality might suffer from extra speed in both cases, but neither workers’ 
independence is compromised.  Id.  If it were, Judge Posner observed, the courts would be 
flooded with cases brought by civil servants complaining about “incidental and 
unintentional” effects of changes in their working conditions.  Id. 
90 See IND. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV., GROSS MISCONDUCT POLICY:  2016, 
https://www.in.gov/dwd/files/gross_misconduct_policy_2016_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9YRL-5LA2]. 
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from employment.91  To challenge an unemployment benefits claim, an 
employer must submit an Unemployment Insurance Protest Form 
(Employer).92  One choice the employer may select on the form is that the 
claimant’s separation from employment was a “[d]ischarge for Cause.”93  
In Indiana, “[d]ischarge for just cause” includes a “knowing violation of a 
reasonable and uniformly enforced rule of an employer . . . .”94  The IDWD 
has informed Indiana employers through its Employer Handbook, 
available on its website, that “‘[d]ischarge for just cause’ means 
discharging (or firing) an employee with complete documentation and 
acknowledgement of understanding by the employee of . . . [k]nowingly 
violating a reasonable and uniformly enforced employer policy or rule.”95  
Consistent with this definition of “just cause,” the IDWD has historically 
issued a questionnaire to employers who protest an unemployment 
benefits claim which includes an inquiry about whether the employer had 
a rule which it contends that the claimant violated, and whether the rule 
was in writing.96  After informing the IDWD that the employee’s 
termination was for “just cause,” an employer is normally asked for proof 
that the rule which the employee violated was in writing and that the 
employee was informed of the written rule.97  If an Indiana employer 
                                                
91 See Unemployment Insurance Employer Handbook, INDIANA WORKFORCE DEV. 31 (2015), 
http://www.in.gov/dwd/files/Employer_Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D37-9L4G] 
(stating that an employer has a chance to protest unemployment benefits where the 
employee was justly discharged from employment). 
92 See Unemployment Insurance Employer Handbook, IND. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV. (2015) 
36 http://www.in.gov/dwd/files/Employer_Handbook.pdf (showing conditions for an 
employer to protest unemployment benefits) [https://perma.cc/8FDT-PDV3].  See also IND. 
DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV., Indiana State Form No. 54244(3-10), DWD 6 40-P, 
https://www.in.gov/dwd/2406.htm [https://perma.cc/Q5LB-RDHS] (showing the 
documentation necessary for an employer to initiate a contest of unemployment benefits). 
93 See Unemployment Insurance Employer Handbook, IND. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV., 
http://www.in.gov/dwd/files/Employer_Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5LB-
RDHS]. 
94 See IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-15-1(d)(2) (2017) (proscribing the laws for unemployment in 
Indiana).  
95 See Unemployment Insurance Employer Handbook, IND. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV. (2015), 
36 http://www.in.gov/dwd/files/Employer_Handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FDT-
PDV3] 
96 See Unemployment Insurance Protest, State Form 54244, IND. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV. 
(2015) (requiring the employer to give a statement for the reason of separation). See also 
Unemployment Insurance Employer Handbook, IND. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV. (2015), 36 
http://www.in.gov/dwd/files/Employer_Handbook.pdf. [https://perma.cc/8FDT-
PDV3]. 
97 Id. 
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cannot show the IDWD that the employee was terminated for violating a 
known and uniformly enforced rule, benefits will be awarded.98   
Wisconsin’s Department of Workforce Development takes the same 
approach.  The Wisconsin agency has explained to employers, “[y]our 
work rules play an important part in a discharge investigation. Rules must 
be reasonable, known to the employee and consistently enforced.”99  This 
shows that state agencies that process such claims also mandate that an 
employer be able to show that the employee had a fair chance to know 
that the conduct which precipitated the discharge from employment was 
prohibited, and that the sanction for a violation was consistent. 
The Court of Appeals of Indiana has addressed the requirement of 
written work rules in the context of unemployment benefits in City of 
Carmel v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development.100  
In its opinion, the appellate court explained: 
The employer bears the initial burden of establishing that 
an employee was terminated for just cause.  To establish 
a prima facie case for just cause discharge for violation of an 
employer rule, the employer has to show that the claimant: (1) 
knowingly violated; (2) a reasonable; and (3) uniformly 
enforced rule.  To have knowingly violated an employer’s rules, 
the employee must: (1) know the rule; and (2) know his conduct 
violated the rule.  If an employer meets this burden, the 
claimant must present evidence to rebut the employer’s prima 
facie showing.101 
The appellate court further stated:  
A uniformly enforced rule is one that is carried out in 
such a way that all persons under the same conditions 
and in the same circumstances are treated alike.  ‘In order 
to evaluate uniformity one must first define the class of 
persons against whom uniformity is measured.’  This 
court has often stated that ‘[a]n employer’s asserted work 
                                                
98 See Co. v Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 58 N.E. 2d 175, 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2016) (violation of a vague work rule that fails to inform the employee of precisely what 
conduct is prohibited does not constitute a rule under Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1 (d)(2) and will 
not constitute “just cause” for discharge so as to disqualify the employee from receiving 
benefits). 
99 WIS. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV., UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE HANDBOOK FOR 
EMPLOYERS:  SECTION 1–BENEFITS: PART 7 ELIGIBILITY (2017), https://dwd.wisconsin.gov/ 
ui201/b7201.htm [https://perma.cc/73KQ-J4AU]. 
100 See 970 N.E.2d at 241 (addressing the usefulness of written employment rules). 
101 Id. at 245 (italics added for emphasis and internal citations omitted). 
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rule must be reduced to writing and introduced into 
evidence to enable this court to fairly and reasonably 
review the determination that an employee was 
discharged for ‘just cause’ for the knowing violation of a 
rule.’  The reason for requiring uniform enforcement of a 
known and reasonable rule is to give notice to employees 
about what punishment they can reasonably anticipate if 
they violate the rule and to protect employees against 
arbitrary enforcement.102  
This concept applies with particular force to behavioral rules.  Akin to the 
due process concerns expressed above, it is only fair that in order to 
discipline an employee for improper behavior, there should first be a rule 
prohibiting the conduct, which should be in writing and made known to 
the employee.  In addition, the behavioral rule should be enforced in a 
timely manner and on a uniform basis. 
Thus, for the reasons described, the dissemination of a conduct rule 
and its timely and uniform enforcement is certainly important to the 
employee who is the subject of a corrective action and perhaps 
discipline.103  Yet, clear rules and the enforcement thereof are equally 
important for any employee who is being negatively affected by a co-
worker’s behavior.104  As Herzberg and Maslow understood, since 
workers must feel safe and secure in the workplace for them to be 
productive, if one employee is acting out and making others in the 
workforce feel distracted, uncomfortable, harassed, or threatened, it is 
incumbent upon the company, through its supervisors and managers, to 
intercede and correct the situation through the enforcement of rules which 
prohibit such conduct.105  When this natural and expected activity by a 
manager does not occur, those whom are victimized cannot perform their 
jobs.106  At best, the affected employees will still attempt to be productive, 
but to a lesser degree, while tolerating the situation.107  A quality 
employee, however, who sees no reason to expect improved working 
conditions, because there are no rules to effect change, may eventually 
                                                
102 Id. 
103 See GOODWIN & GRIFFITH, supra note 73, at 134–37 (noting that discipline is supposed to 
improve the conduct of an employee and not serve as a form of punishment).  Failure to use 
corrective rules can be effectively precluded from correcting an employee’s behavior for that 
employee’s own benefit. Id. 
104 See id. at 17 (discussing the importance of rule enforcement). 
105 See id.  
106 See id. at 133–37 (elaborating on rule enforcement based on ego maturity). 
107 See id. (noting employees’ various need for responsive measures based on ego-maturity 
to rule enforcement). 
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leave the company.108  At worst, an employee who is being subjected to 
inappropriate conduct of a co-worker that is not corrected by the employer 
may develop a meritorious claim of sexual or other form of harassment 
based on a hostile work environment.109  This creates potential exposure 
for an employer, and a possible affirmative defense is discussed in more 
detail below.110 
Another important consideration, separate and apart from legal 
concerns and requirements, is that when an employer hires workers, the 
employees inevitably possess different levels of ego maturity.  In this 
context, the term ego maturity signifies the capacity of a given employee 
to understand the need for order in the workplace and to work in harmony 
with the others and the company to achieve organizational goals.  As a 
result of the varying capacity of employees to act in such a manner, they 
must be controlled and motivated in differing ways.  Some employees can 
only be controlled and motivated through well-defined and consistently 
enforced rules.111 According to one model, ego maturity involves four 
levels which factor into how a supervisor might deal with each category 
of employee.112  The four levels of ego maturity, developed by Stephen 
Earnest, Ph.D., in descending order, are: (1) goals level, (2) self-aware 
level, (3) rules level, and (4) opportunistic level.113 
Goals level employees are the most mature workers in the company.114  
These employees generally possess insight into their own motivation as 
well as the motivation of others.115  They are able to participate in 
establishing goals and solving problems.116  They are fully capable of 
                                                
108 See id. (highlighting the need for strong rule enforcement). 
109  See, e.g., Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).  See also Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (explaining that an employer, when no tangible 
employment action has been taken against the employee, such as a termination, may be able 
to assert an affirmative defense and avoid vicarious liability if it has implemented and 
disseminated an anti-harassment policy). 
110   See infra notes 222–27 and accompanying text (discussing employee liability and 
affirmative defense for discharge). 
111  See GOODWIN & GRIFFITH, supra note 73, at 135 (explaining the characteristics of rules-
level employees). 
112 See id. at 133–37 (defining the levels of ego maturity amongst employees). 
113  See id. at 133–37, 141 (revealing the research involved to establish the categories).  Dr. 
Earnest developed these levels and delivered a lecture on the subject in 1999 at Indiana 
University-Purdue University, Indianapolis, based on research conducted by developmental 
psychologist, Jane Loevinger, entitled, Ego Development: Conceptions and Theories (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1980), 51. 
114 See id. at 136–37 (discussing goals level employees). 
115 See id. (noting the motivation found amongst goals level workers). 
116  See id. (showing the traits of goals level workers). 
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collaborating with co-workers, supervisors, and managers to find 
“win/win” solutions to problems and challenges.117 
Self-aware level employees are the next level down in terms of ego 
maturity.118  These employees have some insight and ability to solve 
problems, which permits them to work toward conflict resolution.119  
Employees who possess this degree of ego maturity are reasonably 
capable of resolving conflict in the workplace, but may be intolerant of co-
workers with less ego maturity.120  These workers may struggle with long-
range planning and fully understanding complex cause and effect 
considerations.121  Resolving conflict with self-aware employees requires 
a careful analysis of the conflict and assisting the employee with a clear 
definition of the particular workplace issue.122 
Rules level employees are another step down on the ego maturity 
ladder.123  These employees are inclined to conform to accepted behavior 
and established practices.124  They are motivated by clearly defined rules, 
and they can be counted on to follow them.125  These are typically polite 
employees who desire workplace fairness.126  They prefer to steer clear of 
unpleasant situations at work.127  On the other hand, rules level employees 
tend to oversimplify the cause and effect relationship of workplace 
problems.128  Although resolving conflicts with employees at this level of 
ego maturity may appear easy, they tend to possess limited insight into 
their own or any co-worker’s motivation, and are prone to simplistic 
cause-and-effect assumptions.129  Consequently, a supervisor who 
attempts to resolve a conflict with a rules level employee must be prepared 
                                                
117  See id. (presenting information about goals level workers). 
118 See id. at 135–36 (discussing self-aware employees). 
119 See id. (explaining the ability of self-aware level employees to problem solve). 
120 See id. (noting self-aware level workers’ moderate ability to settle conflict). 
121 See id. (stating that self-aware level workers require a detailed explanation of conflict 
resolution plans). 
122 See id. (describing how to resolve conflict with self-aware level workers). 
123 See id. at 135 (analyzing the character traits of rules-level employees). 
124 See id. (describing what motivates rules-level employees). 
125 See id. (detailing rules-level employees’ propensity to be rule abiders). 
126 See id. (describing rules level employees and their concerns over workplace fairness).  
See also Indiana Continuing Legal Education Forum, Emerging Trends in Employment Law.  
One Indiana lawyer, Daniel Zamudio, who represents plaintiffs in employment law matters, 
has offered in connection with this article that an employer’s need to manage its workforce 
with rules and policies is not only the concern of the company, but is also a basic expectation 
of the clients he represents.  After all, as this attorney recognizes, most employees desire an 
orderly workplace.  This is another confirmation that Herzberg and Maslow knew of what 
they wrote. 
127 See GOODWIN & GRIFFITH, supra note 73, at 135 (noting how rules-level employees prefer 
to avoid conflicts). 
128 See id. (explaining how rules-level employees handle conflict in the workplace). 
129 See id. (providing insight into the psychology of rules level employees). 
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to explain why the conflict exists, clearly explain the issues, and then 
encourage questions.130  While a rules level employee will be inclined to 
conform to a solution, the lack of insight may result in a solution that is 
not a long-term solution, despite the initial appearance of a resolution.131 
Opportunistic level employees possess the least amount of ego 
maturity.132  They usually view conflicts as a competition.133  Any gain for 
the other side is deemed as a loss for this type of employee.134  These 
employees often demonstrate an uncanny grasp of any loopholes in the 
rules or the absence of applicable rules, so they can assert that they were 
not in violation.135  Opportunistic level employees cannot be relied on for 
insight, honesty or acceptance of responsibility, will manipulate others to 
get their way, and will blame their workplace problems on any person or 
any circumstance, rather than on their own decisions and actions.136  
Supervising this category of employee is a constant challenge, and 
perhaps the only way to control such employees is with clear rules that 
are consistently enforced through a progressive discipline program.137 
As one can appreciate, with this wide range of employee maturity, 
while an employer may hope to work well with goal-oriented employees, 
such optimism is not warranted for other segments of the workforce.138  
As a result, there is little hope for an employer to guide and control certain 
immature workers without rules and consequences. The NLRB’s intrusion 
on an employer’s use of such necessary rules to orient and control 
employees and preserve order has created a real problem.139 
IV.  AN EMPLOYER’S IRRECONCILABLE DILEMMA 
While established notions of workplace fairness and bottom line 
requirements of workforce development agencies mandate that 
employees be permitted to understand the employer’s expectations, 
through written rules and policies that are made known to the workforce 
and consistently enforced, the NLRB has taken the position that many 
work rules designed to orient workers and provide order are unlawful 
                                                
130 See id. (describing how to resolve a conflict with rules-level employees). 
131 See id. (detailing a rules-level employee’s tendency to conform and accept resolutions 
made by their employer). 
132 See id. at 134 (explaining the characteristics of opportunistic-level employees). 
133 See id. (analyzing opportunistic-level employee maturity in the workplace). 
134 See id. 
135 See id. (describing the way opportunistic-level employees frame conflict). 
136 See id. 
137 See id. (identifying the true purpose of corrective actions and progressive discipline). 
138 See id. at 136–37 (describing goal-oriented employees). 
139 See infra Part IV (explaining how the NLRB has overstepped on employers’ ability to 
effectively discipline employees). 
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because they have the potential to violate an employee’s Section 7 
rights.140  A prime example of the NLRB’s position is found in its Report 
of General Counsel Regarding Employee Rules (the “Report”).141  In the 
Report, the NLRB’s General Counsel informed all NLRB Regional 
Directors, Officers in Charge, and Resident Officers about the NLRB’s 
position on the unlawfulness of many seemingly innocuous workplace 
rules.142  For instance, the NLRB found numerous rules to be unlawfully 
overbroad because employees “reasonably would construe them to ban 
protected criticism or protests regarding their supervisors, management, 
or the employer in general.”143  Such “unlawful” rules included: 
x [B]e respectful to the company, other employees, 
customers, partners, and competitors. 
x Do not make fun of, denigrate, or defame your co-
workers, customers, franchisees, suppliers, the 
Company, or our competitors. 
x Be respectful of others and the Company. 
x No defamatory, libelous, slanderous or 
discriminatory comments about the Company, its 
customers and/or competitors, its employees or 
management.144 
The NLRB also determined that it was unlawful for employers to prohibit 
the following behavior: 
x Disrespectful conduct or insubordination, including, 
but not limited to, refusing to follow orders from a 
supervisor or a designated representative. 
x ‘Chronic resistance to proper work-related orders or 
discipline, even though not overt insubordination,’ 
will result in discipline.145 
                                                
140 See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935) (giving employees with 
the right to organize and collectively bargain). 
141 See Richard F. Griffin, Report of General Counsel Concerning Employer, Rules, 1–3 (Mar. 
18, 2015), https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/NLRB%20Handbook%20Guidance. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/28Z4-QWDM] (reporting notable information on cases adjudicated 
by the NLRB). 
142 The general counsel’s opinions and advice memoranda are not binding on the NLRB or 
any court, but they reveal whether such rules or policies will be perceived by the NLRB as a 
violation of Section 8 of the NLRA.  Id. at 3. 
143 Id. at 7. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 8. 
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The NLRB took issue with these two rules because it believes that while 
they prohibit insubordination, they also preclude an employee from 
conduct that does not rise to the level of insubordination, which the NLRB 
asserts “reasonably would be understood as including protected 
concerted activity.”146  In short, the NLRB appears to be outlawing an 
employer from requiring its workforce to be respectful and follow the 
directions of superiors, based on a professed concern that an employee 
would interpret the language as a rule which interferes with Section 7 
rights.147 
In its Report, the NLRB concluded that additional rules also were 
impermissibly overbroad.  The rules which the NLRB found to be 
problematic included: 
 
x Refrain from any action that would harm persons or 
property or cause damage to the Company’s business 
or reputation.  
x It is important that employees practice caution and 
discretion when posting content [on social media] 
that could affect [the Employer’s] business operation 
or reputation.  
x Do not make ‘[s]tatements ‘that damage the company 
or the company’s reputation or that disrupt or 
damage the company’s business relationships.’  
x Never engage in behavior that would undermine the 
reputation of [the Employer], your peers or 
yourself.148 
The Report was based upon the Board’s holding in Quicken Loans, Inc., 
where it concluded that employees have the right, under Section 7 of the 
NLRA, to criticize an employer’s labor policies and its treatment of 
employees, including in a public forum.149  According to the NLRB, these 
rules were unlawfully overbroad because they “reasonably would be read 
to require employees to refrain from criticizing the employer in public.”150   
The NLRB has recognized that while the NLRA protects an employee 
who criticizes an employer’s labor practices or working conditions, the 
protection does not extend to a worker’s disparagement of an employer’s 
                                                
146 Id. 
147 See id. (providing a summary of what the NLRB is outlawing).  
148 Id. 
149 See 361 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (Nov. 3, 2013) (ordering that the employer cease and desist from 
upholding rules that barred employees from criticizing the employer’s labor practices). 
150 Griffin, supra note 141, at 8. 
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product.151  Yet, with regard to the rules it disallowed, the NLRB 
determined that there was insufficient context or examples to distinguish 
between rules pertaining to working conditions and those protecting the 
company’s product to save the rules from being considered an unlawful 
infringement on Section 7 rights.152 
Under the heading, Lawful Rules Regulating Employee Conduct Towards 
the Employer, the NLRB did approve of the following rules: 
x No ‘rudeness or unprofessional behavior toward a 
customer, or anyone in contact with’ the company. 
x Employees will not be discourteous or disrespectful 
to a customer or any member of the public while in 
the course and scope of [company] business.153 
Of course the problem with the NLRB’s approval of these particular rules 
regarding “conduct towards the employer” is that they have nothing to 
do with conduct towards the employer.154  These rules merely regulate 
conduct toward customers and members of the public, not conduct 
toward co-workers, supervisors, or managers. Thus, despite some 
apparent concessions, the NLRB’s exceptions to its concerns about a 
violation of Section 7 rights are unhelpful for any employer attempting to 
guide and control its workforce for legitimate psychological, motivational, 
and legal reasons. 
According to the NLRB’s report, some workplace conduct rules were 
also deemed to be acceptable.  They were as follows: 
x Each employee is expected to work in a cooperative 
manner with management/supervision, coworkers, 
customers and vendors. 
x Each employee is expected to abide by Company 
policies and to cooperate fully in any investigation 
that the Company may undertake. 
x ‘Being insubordinate, threatening, intimidating, 
disrespectful or assaulting a manager/supervisor, 
coworker, customer or vendor will result in’ 
discipline.155 
                                                
151 See id. (stating that employees are not protected when their conduct is purely 
disparaging to an employer’s product). 
152 See id. (providing another example of a rule the NLRB found to be lawful). 
153 Id. at 9. 
154 Id. at 7 (italics added for emphasis). 
155 Id. at 9. 
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The NLRB’s rationale for approving the later rule is that it addresses 
serious misconduct, instead of garden variety disrespect or 
insubordination.156  With regard to the first two rules, the NLRB believed 
that employees would reasonably understand the first one to encourage 
employees to work together in an atmosphere of civility, while the second 
one would apply only to investigations of workplace misconduct.157  
Based on these comments, the NLRB apparently believes it is unlawful for 
an employer to prohibit insubordinate, denigrating, and disrespectful 
behavior in a general sense, but it is acceptable to have such rules if they 
pertain to serious misconduct or are for the purpose of encouraging 
civility in the workplace.158  This distinction is confusing, and the 
confusion is exacerbated by the subjective standard the NLRB utilizes in 
analyzing a rule, which amounts to a hypothetical inquiry into “whether 
employees would read the rule’s language in a manner that would 
prohibit Section 7 activity.”159  Furthermore, while the Report appears to 
include an assurance that the NLRB will read workplace rules in context 
and approve those rules which are designed to promote civility, many of 
the decisions issued by the NLRB belie that assurance.160 
One example of such a case is T-Mobile U.S.A., Inc.161  Consistent 
with its aggressive review of employee handbooks, the NLRB found 
numerous workplace rules in T-Mobile’s employee handbook and the 
employee handbook of MetroPCS Communications, Inc. to be unlawful, 
including language which required positive workplace behavior.162  The 
NLRB determined that the following provisions were unlawful because 
employees would reasonably construe them to interfere with their Section 
7 rights:  (1) a policy that explained that all employees should “behave in 
a professional manner that promotes efficiency, productivity, and 
cooperation” and “maintain a positive work environment by 
                                                
156 See id. (explaining the rationale behind the NLRB’s approval for the rule). 
157 See id. (providing the NLRB’s apparent reason for allowing these particular rules). 
158 See id. (explaining that the Court found a rule requiring cooperation amongst employees 
to be lawful because the employees would reasonably understand that the employer had a 
legitimate expectation that there be an atmosphere of civility between co-workers and a rule 
requiring cooperation between employers’ investigations would reasonably be interpreted 
by employees to refer to an investigation relating to workplace misconduct). 
159 See id. at 2, 4 (suggesting that the Board’s decisions regarding employer rules often 
hinge on whether the employees would reasonably construe the rules to prohibit protected 
activity). 
160 See id. at 4, 9 (noting that rules will be viewed in context and rules outlining an 
employer’s expectation that employees keep an “atmosphere of civility” are lawful). 
161 See 363 N.L.R.B. No. 171, 1–5 (2016) (holding that portions of T-Mobiles policies were 
unlawful because they could reasonably be construed to interfere with employee rights, 
despite the fact that the policies were intended to promote civility). 
162 See id. at 12–15, 18, 20, 23–25 (finding various rules in the employee handbooks of both 
T-Mobile and MetroPCS to be unlawful for violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA). 
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communicating in a manner that is conducive to effective working 
relationships with internal and external customers, clients, co-workers, 
and management”; and (2) a rule that prohibited employees from using 
the company’s “information or communication resources in ways that 
could reasonably be considered disruptive, offensive, or harmful to 
morale.”163  The Board concluded that these workplace rules were facially 
invalid because they served to inhibit the Section 7 rights of workers to 
engage in “concerted activities for collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection.”164  In its decision, the Board acknowledged that the 
rules did not explicitly restrict protected activities and were not 
promulgated in response to or applied to restrict Section 7 activities, but 
the lack of an unlawful purpose did not save the rules from being deemed 
unlawful.165 
In Tinley Park Hotel & Convention Ctr., LLC & Audelia Santiago, an 
employee was fired for criticizing her employer on Facebook in violation 
of workplace rules.166  The employer’s rules prohibited employees from 
making “false or malicious” statements about the company and from 
engaging in: 
discourteous or disrespectful treatment 
of . . . supervisors, or fellow associates, or displaying 
“disloyalty, including disparaging or denigrating the 
food, beverages, or services of the company,” as well as 
“[a]ny other conduct that the company believes has 
created, or may lead to the creation of a situation that may 
disrupt or interfere with the amicable, profitable and safe 
operation of the company.”167 
The facts of the case involve a banquet server at a hotel who, while 
working an extended shift, went on break with her coworkers where they 
began taking selfies, after which they posted the images on Facebook.168  
Social media communications then followed, including an exchange 
between the employee and her Facebook friends regarding:  “how hard 
[the employee] and other employees had been working.  [The employee] 
                                                
163 Id. at 2, 22. 
164 Id. at 1, 19. 
165 See id. at 1 (clarifying that the rules at issue had not been alleged to explicitly restrict 
protected Section 7 activities). 
166 See JD-36-15, 4 (2015) (describing the details of the situation in which an employee was 
fired after using her cell phone, while at work, to post a photo of co-workers on Facebook 
and later commenting back and forth with some of her friends, criticizing her employer). 
167 Id. at 9. 
168 See id. at 4 (detailing the events of the employees’ policy violation, in which she took 
some photos with her co-workers during a break and posted them to Facebook). 
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stated she had been working like a ‘slave’ and noted that she had no time 
to play games like she used to do.”169  In ruling that the employee’s 
termination was unlawful, the NLRB concluded that the company’s rules 
“reasonably could be construed to prohibit protected activity, such as 
coworkers discussing with one another the complaints they have about 
their supervisors.”170  The Board found that the rules were overly broad, 
and then addressed the termination, holding that while the Facebook 
posts were not concerted activity (because the friends were not fellow 
employees), the posts were still protected because “[e]mployees’ 
complaints about their hours of work, including heavy workloads, long 
have constituted protected activity.”171  There are many more cases in 
which the NLRB reached similar, troubling conclusions.172 
In First Transit Inc. and Amalgamated Transit Union Local #1433 AFL-
CIO, the NLRB again ruled that numerous provisions in an employee 
handbook were unlawful.173  The Board rejected rules, among others, that 
prohibited discourteous or inappropriate attitude or behavior toward 
other employees, prohibited employees from making false statements 
about the company, and prohibited employees from conducting 
themselves “during non-working hours in such a manner that the conduct 
would be detrimental to the interest or reputation of the company.”174  The 
NLRB’s problem with these workplace conduct rules was that they were 
sufficiently ambiguous to cause employees to reasonably construe them 
as limiting their communications and therefore violating their right to 
engage in protected concerted activity.175 
In Hills and Dales General Hospital and Danielle Corlis, the NLRB 
received a complaint against the hospital after it issued a written warning 
                                                
169 Id. at 7. 
170 Id. at 6. 
171 Id. at 7. 
172 See, e.g., Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Services, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 349, 356 
(2000) (invalidating a rule that prohibited “false or misleading work-related statements 
concerning the company, the facility or fellow associates.”); Purple Communications, Inc., 
361 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 62 (2014) (rejecting a rule that prohibited employees from “[c]ausing, 
creating, or participating in a disruption of any kind during working hours on [c]ompany 
property.”).  See also Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, 1754 (2012) (finding a 
rule unlawful because it prohibited “language which injures the image or reputation of the 
[employer]” and prohibited being “disrespectful” to co-workers or others); KSL Claremont 
Resort, Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 836 (2005) (striking down a rule that prohibited “[n]egative 
conversations about associates and/or managers.”). 
173 See First Transit, Inc., 360 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 619 (2014) (ruling that numerous provisions 
in the employers handbook unlawfully violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because employees 
could reasonably construe the language as prohibiting protected activity). 
174 Id. at 622.  
175 See id. at 621, 628 (finding the rule to be ambiguous and overbroad because it could 
reasonably be construed to prohibit employees from free communication). 
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to an employee about her Facebook post.176  The employee posted the 
comments in response to a post by a former employee, who had been 
terminated for throwing a yogurt cup at her boss, as follows:  “Holy 
[expletive], rock on . . . Way to talk about the [expletive] you used to work 
with. I LOVE IT!!!”177  The employee received a warning that her post 
violated paragraph 16 of the hospital’s Values and Standards of Behavior 
Policy, which provided that employees “will represent Hills and Dales in 
the community in a positive and professional manner in every 
opportunity.”178  The Board did not focus on that single paragraph, but 
instead examined the entire Values and Standards of Behavior Policy and 
ruled that paragraph 16, as well as paragraph 11, which precluded 
employees from making “negative comments about . . . fellow team 
members,” and paragraph 21, which states that employees “will not 
engage in or listen to negativity or gossip,” violated Section 7 because they 
could inhibit employees from engaging in protected concerted 
activities.179  The NLRB ruled that policies that prohibit conversations that 
are critical of coworkers or managers are unlawful on their face.180  The 
NLRB further determined that paragraph 16 was unlawful because the 
requirement that employees must be positive and professional 
representatives of the employer in the community “is just as overbroad 
and ambiguous as the proscription of ‘negative comments’ and 
‘negativity.’”181 
It is interesting that the NLRB, in deciding cases such as Quicken Loans, 
Inc., infra, did not merely conclude that a company’s rules are susceptible 
to a broad interpretation; rather, it claimed to know that employees would 
gravitate toward the most liberal reading of the language so as to keep 
themselves from engaging in protected and concerted activities.182  This 
prescient approach by the Board is contrary to the method employed by 
the many learned jurists who serve in the country’s federal trial and 
appellate courts.183  As explained in Coleman v. Donahoe, “[i]n adjudicating 
claims under federal employment discrimination statutes, a court does not 
sit as a ‘super-personnel department,’ second-guessing an employer’s 
                                                
176 See Hills and Dales General Hospital, 360 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 615 (2014) (stating that an 
employee received a written warning for posting a comment on Facebook for violating one 
of the employers policies). 
177 Id. at 615. 
178 Id. at 616. 
179 Id. at 611–12, 616. 
180 See id. at 611 (quoting Claremont Resort and Spa, 344 NLRB 832). 
181 Id. at 612. 
182 See 359 N.L.R.B. No. 141 (2013) (concluding that employees could reasonably read the 
rules as restricting their rights to engage in protected activities). 
183 See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 862 (7th Cir. 2012) (portraying the method used 
by the Seventh Circuit in deciding such cases). 
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‘business decision as to whether someone should be fired or disciplined 
because of a work-rule violation.’”184  Based upon this judicial restraint, a 
federal court will afford an employer the opportunity to articulate a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an employment decision which 
resulted in an adverse employment action for a worker.185  This is because 
                                                
184 Id. 
185 See Krchnavy v. Limagrain Genetics Corporation, 294 F.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801–03 (1973)) (setting forth the burden-
shifting analysis, whereby a plaintiff is first required to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination by providing membership in a protected class, job performance at a level 
which met the employer’s legitimate expectations, an adverse employment action, and 
treatment different than a similarly situated employee outside the protected class).  Only 
where a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case will the burden shift to the employer to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.  Id. at 876.  
Thereafter, once the employer proffers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the 
employment action, the burden returns to the plaintiff to show the proffered basis is a pretext 
for discrimination.  Id.  See also O’Reagan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 983 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (reiterating the procedure and elements for a prima facie case); Peele v. Country 
Mutual Insurance Co., 288 F.3d 319, 327 (7th Cir. 2002) (“If a plaintiff is unable to establish a 
prima facie case of employment discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, an employer may 
not be subjected to a pretext inquiry.”); Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, 224 F.3d 
681, 685 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that pretext is more than a poor business judgment: it “means 
a dishonest explanation, a lie rather than an oddity or an error”); Smith v. Chicago Transit 
Authority, 806 F.3d 900, 905 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that the direct and indirect approaches 
method, which is a tool for a summary judgment analysis, appears to be in the process of 
being phased out in favor of “a more straight-forward analysis which explores whether a 
reasonable jury could infer prohibited discrimination”); Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 
834 F.3d 760, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2016) (criticizing the differentiation between direct and indirect 
evidence in discrimination cases).  More specifically, the Seventh Circuit goes on to state: 
[a]ccordingly, we hold that district courts must stop separating ‘direct’ 
from ‘indirect’ evidence and proceeding as if they were subject to 
different legal standards.  Once again, this court must accept its share of 
the responsibility—because even as some panels were disparaging the 
“direct” and “indirect” approaches, other panels were articulating them 
as governing legal standards.  We need to bring harmony to circuit law, 
and the way to do that is to overrule Andrews, 743 F.3d 230; Silverman, 
637 F.3d 729; Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 
2007); Rhodes, 359 F.3d at 498; Haywood v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 323 
F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2003); Oest v. Illinois Department of Corrections, 240 F.3d 
605 (7th Cir. 2001); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 
2000); Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Group, Inc., 129 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 1997); 
Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir. 1988); and La 
Montagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 
1984), to the extent that these opinions insist on the use of the direct-
and-indirect framework.  (As with the convincing-mosaic cases, we are 
not saying that any of these decisions produced a victory for the wrong 
litigant; our concern is with the legal standards they employed rather 
than with their outcomes.)  One point of clarification may be helpful. 
The burden-shifting framework created by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), sometimes is 
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federal courts are “concerned solely with whether the reason for which 
the [employer] discharged the [employee] was discriminatory.”186  Thus, 
when an employer establishes a reason for its actions that is not forbidden 
by law, federal courts understand that it is not their province to decide 
whether the decision was wise, fair, or even correct, so long as it was the 
actual reason for the adverse employment action.187 
By contrast, the NLRB does not afford an employer the opportunity to 
demonstrate the lawful application of its workplace rules and policies.188  
It simply deems them facially unlawful.  Worse still, the NLRB does not 
even need to be presented with an adverse employment action by an 
employer; instead, it immediately assumes that any language susceptible 
of a broad interpretation will, in turn, render the workforce susceptible of 
an improper infringement on Section 7 rights, thereby stripping the 
employer of legitimate and necessary rules and policies to guide and 
control its workers.189 
                                                
referred to as an “indirect” means of proving employment 
discrimination. Today’s decision does not concern McDonnell Douglas or 
any other burden-shifting framework, no matter what it is called as a 
shorthand.  We are instead concerned about the proposition that 
evidence must be sorted into different piles, labeled “direct” and 
“indirect,” that are evaluated differently.  Instead, all evidence belongs 
in a single pile and must be evaluated as a whole.  That conclusion is 
consistent with McDonnell Douglas and its successors. 
Id. 
186 Giannopoulos v. Brach & Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 1997). 
187 See id. at 411 (finding that it is not the court’s job to judge an employer’s reason for 
terminating an employee, so long as the reason given is the true and accurate reason the 
employee was terminated). 
188 See Fred Miner and Adam Tuzzo, NLRB General Counsel Issues Report Concerning Legality 
of Common Employer Rules, LITTLER (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.littler.com/nlrb-general-
counsel-issues-report-concerning-legality-common-employer-rules 
[https://perma.cc/G63L-PK2Z] (describing the context for the NLRB’s Report and review 
of the rules and policies in employee handbooks). 
189 See id. at 2 (explaining that the NLRB places a high burden on employers to ensure that 
their rules and policies are not overly broad).  See also Trip, Employers With No Visible Tattoo 
Policies, TAT2X (June 16, 2015), http://blog.tat2x.com/employers-with-no-visible-tattoo-
policies/ [https://perma.cc/P22R-AE4R] (listing the employers who have policies in place 
which either prohibit or limit visible tattoos on their employees).  Taken to its extreme, one 
can envision the NLRB concluding that an employer’s no tattoos policy constitutes an 8(a) 
violation.  Many prominent employers fall within the NLRB’s jurisdiction require tattoos to 
be covered.  Id.  One could easily argue, based upon numerous NLRB rulings, that these 
policies violate the Section 7 rights of workers because they would conclude that they are 
prohibited from any type of union speech or work-related speech through an expression via 
a tattoo.  Id.  This would be particularly true with regard to those policies which inject an 
element of subjectivity by only forbidding tattoos which the company finds offensive.  Id.  
The Unites States Postal Service has such a subjective “some tattoos OK” policy.  Id.  Police 
departments in Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Huntsville, Los Angeles, San Diego, and St. Louis 
are among the forces which ban visible tattoos.  Id.  According to the NLRB’s way of thinking, 
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The NLRB’s “throw the baby out with the bathwater” approach 
creates an unavoidable dilemma for employers in the area of sexual 
harassment law.190  The Board, for instance, has rejected as unlawful a 
company memo informing its workers that threats, intimidation, and 
harassment among workers was unacceptable and that the company 
intended to “enforce [its] Workplace Violence Prevention Policy to keep 
[the] workplace free from such improper conduct.”191  The Board’s refusal 
to allow employers to control and protect their employees cannot be 
reconciled with the guidance provided by the EEOC on workplace 
harassment, which requires that “an anti-harassment policy and 
complaint procedure . . . should contain, at a minimum . . . [a]ssurance 
that the employer will protect the confidentiality of harassment 
complaints to the extent possible.”192 
The NLRB’s approach brings to mind the compelling testimony 
offered by the late Frank Zappa of The Mothers of Invention fame, a 
uniquely talented musical artist whose “life’s work reveals two consistent 
concerns:  bullies and First Amendment issues.”193  It seems that Mary 
Elizabeth “Tipper” Gore, estranged spouse of former Vice President Al 
Gore, Jr., became alarmed, in 1984, about the lyrical content of Prince and 
the Revolution’s album, Purple Rain.194  Mrs. Gore inspired the formation 
                                                
all of these policies must be per se unlawful because they have the effect of chilling Section 7 
rights.  Id.  See also infra note 172 and accompanying text (explaining the standard for 
determining whether a rule violates Section 7 rights).  Yet, they pass muster according to the 
anti-discrimination laws because they are facially neutral.  Cf. infra note 193 and 
accompanying text (describing the elements of a prima facie anti-discrimination case). 
190 See, e.g.,  Care One at Madison Avenue, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 159, *6 (2014) (indicating 
the NLRB’s approach to dealing with sexual harassment law). See also Throw The Baby Out 
With The Bathwater, GRAMMARIST, http://grammarist.com/usage/throw-the-baby-out-
with-the-bathwater/ [https://perma.cc/M8BR-RC74] (“To throw the baby out with the 
bathwater is an idiom which means to lose something important while trying to get rid of 
unwanted things . . .  The phrase is directly translated from a German proverb dating from 
at least 1512.  In German it reads das Kind mit dem Bade ausschütten.  It was paired with an 
illustration of a woman dumping a tub of water and an infant falling out into the river.”). 
191 Care One at Madison Avenue, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 159 at *2. 
192 Ida L. Castro, Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful 
Harassment by Supervisors, U.S. EEOC (June 18, 1999), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/ 
harassment.html [https://perma.cc/5R6H-SA4M]. 
193 James Stafford, 30 Years Ago: Frank Zappa Responds to the PMRC on ‘Frank Zappa Meets 
the Mothers of Prevention’, ULTIMATE CLASSIC ROCK (Nov. 21, 2015), 
http://ultimateclassicrock.com/frank-zappa-meets-the-mothers-of-prevention/ 
[https://perma.cc/349X-K2KD]. 
194  See id. (describing Tipper’s reaction to Purple Rain). See also Tipper Gore Bio, CNN ALL 
POLITICS, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/conventions/chicago/players/ 
gore/tipper.shtml [https://perma.cc/4F3F-7VMF] (detailing the life of Tipper Gore, 
including how she met former Vice President Al Gore, their marriage, and his eventual 
inclusion in politics). 
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of the Parents Music Resource Center (PMRC), among whose aims was to 
require a system similar to what was being used in the movie industry to 
rate the content of music albums.195 
In 1985, the PMRC’s effort to chill recording artists’ language based 
on a presumption that it would be put to bad use raised a serious prior 
restraint issue for Mr. Zappa.196  In response to the attempted censorship, 
Mr. Zappa, in a prepared statement, provided: 
The PMRC proposal is an ill-conceived piece of nonsense 
which fails to deliver any real benefits to children, 
infringes the civil liberties of people who are not children, 
and promises to keep the courts busy for years dealing 
with the interpretational and enforcemental problems 
inherent in the proposals design.  It is my understanding 
that, in law, First Amendment issues are decided with a 
preference for the least restrictive alternative.  In this 
context, the PMRC’s demands are the equivalent of 
treating dandruff by decapitation . . . . The establishment 
of a rating system, voluntary or otherwise, opens the door 
to an endless parade of moral quality control programs 
based on things certain Christians do not like.  What if the 
next bunch of Washington wives demands a large yellow 
“J” on all material written or performed by Jews, in order 
to save helpless children from exposure to concealed 
Zionist doctrine?197 
On November 1, 1985, before the “porn rock” hearing, as it came to be 
known, concluded, the Recording Industry Association of America agreed 
to place Parental Advisory stickers on certain releases at its own 
discretion, rather than the descriptive labels categorizing the lyrics, as 
advocated for by the PMRC.198  Mr. Zappa fully understood that a radical 
                                                
195 See Stafford, supra note 193 and accompanying text (depicting the concern of Ms. Gore 
regarding the censoring of music such as Purple Rain). 
196 See Contents of Music and the Lyrics of Records: Hearing Before the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong. 23 (1985) (statement of George David Weiss) 
(explaining PMRC’s efforts to censor explicit lyrics in order to protect children listeners).  
197 Contents of Music and the Lyrics of Records: Hearing Before the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong. 52, 54 (1985) (statement of Frank Zappa). 
198 See Zach Schonfeld, Does the Parental Advisory Label Still Matter?, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 10, 
2015, 3:20 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/does-parental-advisory-label-still-matter-
tipper-gore-375607 [http://perma.cc/4PW6-WVM9] (noting that the RIAA chose to label 
records to inform the public of possibly offensive lyrical content). 
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reaction to a predicted problem, in advance of it actually transpiring, is 
often an ill-conceived way to address a concern.199 
The NLRB’s solution to perceived infringements on employees’ 
Section 7 rights amounts to a more recent attempt at, in Mr. Zappa’s 
compelling terms, “treating dandruff by decapitation.”  If there are indeed 
aspects of a company’s conduct rules or policies which must be cured, 
then the NLRB is fully authorized to affect the appropriate remedy as 
problems arise.200  It does indeed amount to improper censorship, 
however, for the NLRB, in an overzealous, pre-emptive effort to protect 
the very employees the company’s rules are designed to protect, to lop off 
the heads of management, and to outlaw well-intended efforts to guide 
and control a workforce.201 
Beyond the right employers must possess to control and protect their 
employees with workplace rules and policies, the Supreme Court has 
explained that employers actually have a legal duty to implement 
measures to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace, and employers 
can potentially avoid vicarious liability if those measures provide a means 
of recourse for a victimized employee.202  This is known as the Faragher 
Ellerth affirmative defense.203  This affirmative defense is available to an 
                                                
199 See Contents of Music and the Lyrics of Records: Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, supra note 197, at 52, 54 (pointing out the inadequacies of the PMRC and 
rebuking their effort to censor offensive lyric content). 
200 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2012) (assigning powers to the 
National Labor Relations Board to prevent a person from using unfair labor practices).  
201 See infra Part IV (describing the outlawed rules that have resulted in problems for 
employees). 
202 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 809 (1998) (requiring that measures be 
taken to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace). 
203 See L. Castro, Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful 
Harassment by Supervisors, EEOC (Apr. 6, 2010), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/ 
docs/harassment.html [http://perma.cc/6Q89-RJ62] (recognizing the affirmative defense to 
harassment claims whereby employers take necessary steps to prevent harassment).  See also 
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (holding that an employee can be regarded 
as a “supervisor” if the supervisor gives them power to take tangible employment actions 
against a victim).  The Supreme Court rejected in part the EEOC’s definition of supervisor.  
Id. at 2443.  The EEOC acknowledged that the Supreme Court held that an employee is a 
supervisor if the employer has empowered that employee “to take tangible employment 
actions against the victim, i.e., to affect a ‘significant change in employment status, such as 
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, 
or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’”  Id. at 2443 (quoting Burlington 
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (defining a tangible employment action)).  
According to the Supreme Court, an employer is liable for hostile work environment 
harassment by employees who are not supervisors if the employer was “negligent in failing 
to prevent harassment from taking place.”  Id. at 2453.  In assessing such negligence, the 
Supreme Court indicated that “the nature and degree of authority wielded by the harasser 
is an important factor to be considered in determining whether the employer was negligent.”  
Id. at 2451.  It also ruled that “[e]vidence that an employer did not monitor the workplace, 
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employer who is charged with claims of harassment under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, or one of the state civil rights laws.204  
The Supreme Court first articulated the affirmative defense in the 
companion cases decided on June 26, 1998.  One case is Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton.205  The sister case is Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.206 
In Ellerth, the plaintiff, Kimberly Ellerth, from early 1993 until mid-
1994, worked as a salesperson in one of Burlington’s Chicago divisions.207  
Once Ellerth was hired, her boss began making sexual advances toward 
her, accompanying her on business trips; and once, in a hotel lounge, after 
“ogling her body,” is alleged to have said, “you know, Kim, I could make 
your life very hard or very easy at Burlington.”208  Later, in a telephone 
conversation, Ellerth’s boss reportedly said, “I don’t have time for you 
right now, Kim, unless you tell me what you’re wearing.”209  He also 
supposedly commented that shorter skirts would help, rubbed her knee, 
and said she was not “loose enough” for him.210 
Ellerth’s boss’s statement that he could make her life very hard or very 
easy could have amounted to one element of a quid pro quo sexual 
harassment claim.211  She did not, however, accept the propositions and 
                                                
failed to respond to complaints, failed to provide a system for registering complaints, or 
effectively discouraged complaints from being filed” is relevant to the analysis.  Id. at 2453. 
204 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—2(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”).  See also Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor 
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)):  While the statute mentions specific 
employment decisions with immediate consequences, the scope of the prohibition is not 
limited to “economic” or “tangible” discrimination. Id.  See also Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (discussing that the prohibition covers more 
than “‘terms’ and ‘conditions’ in the narrow contractual sense”); Meritor Savings Bank, 477 
U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1982)).  As a result, it is understood 
that when sexual harassment is so “severe or pervasive” as to “alter the conditions of [the 
victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment,” violates Title VII.  Id.  
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-9-1-1–18 (2014) (Indiana’s Civil Rights Law). 
205 See 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) (finding that employers are subject to an affirmative defense 
that evaluates the reasonableness of the action they took to prevent sexual harassment). 
206 See id. at 765 (highlighting that an affirmative action is available for an employer if no 
tangible employment action is taken, the employer took reasonable measures to prevent 
sexual harassment, and the victim employee unreasonably failed to utilize those measures). 
207 Id. at 747. 
208 Id. at 748. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 See Quid Pro Quo, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/quid_pro_quo 
[http://perma.cc/EU9A-PB2S] (defining “quid pro quo”).  In general, this term is Latin for 
“something for something.”  Id.  It means an “exchange of acts or things of approximately 
equal value.”  Id.  In employment law, this is a form of “sexual harassment in which a boss 
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also did not lose her job or miss out on any promotion as a result.212  Yet, 
after approximately one more year, Ellerth quit when her boss allegedly 
refused to authorize a project, and asked on the telephone, “Are you 
wearing shorter skirts yet . . . ?”213 
In a 7-to-2 opinion, with Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas 
dissenting, the Supreme Court, in a decision authored by Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, ruled that an employer is subject to vicarious liability when its 
employee has been subjected to an actionable hostile environment created 
by a supervisor “with immediate (or successively higher) authority over 
the employee.”214  The Supreme Court explained that in circumstances 
where no tangible adverse employment action is taken, an employer may 
assert an affirmative defense to liability or damages, “subject to proof by 
a preponderance of the evidence.”215  The defense consists of two parts:  
“(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly 
correct any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the aggrieved 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or 
remedial opportunities.”216  The Supreme Court further ruled that 
although proof of an anti-harassment policy with a complaint procedure 
is not necessary in every case as a matter of law, the need for a policy 
suitable to the circumstances may appropriately be addressed when 
                                                
conveys to an employee that he or she will base an employment decision,” such as “whether 
to hire, promote, or fire that employee, on the employee’s satisfaction of a sexual demand.”  
Id.  “For example, it is quid pro quo sexual harassment for a boss to offer a raise in exchange 
for sex.”  Id. 
212 See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 742 (1998) (stating that Ellerth 
rejected her boss’s advances and that she never suffered any retaliation as a result). 
213 See id. at 748 (summarizing Ellerth’s harassment claim). 
214 Id. at 745.  See also How Much Is Enough? Difficulties Defining “Hostile Work Environment” 
In Title VII Harassment Claims, FINDLAW, http://corporate.findlaw.com/human-
resources/how-much-is-enough-difficulties-defining-hostile-
work.html#sthash.zTkxAEYr.dpuf [http://perma.cc/4MS8-Q2DV] (discussing the factors 
that should be considered to find harassment).  An actionable hostile environment is 
determined by looking at: 
“[T]he totality of the circumstances,” including: the frequency of the 
harassing conduct, the severity of the conduct, whether the conduct is 
physically threatening and whether the conduct unreasonably interferes 
with an employee’s work performance.  No one factor is required in 
order to find actionable harassment, and there is no precise formula to 
use when considering these factors. 
Id.  See also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 53 
U.S. 75, 82 (1998)) (asserting that workplace comments alone are generally not sufficient to 
create a hostile work environment).  This rationale is that the “severe or pervasive” 
requirement contained in the law was designed to “filter out complaints attacking ‘the 
ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender 
related jokes, and occasional teasing.’”  Id. 
215 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
216 Id. 
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evaluating the first element of the defense.217  Also, a showing that the 
affected employee unreasonably failed to use a complaint procedure 
provided by the employer will usually satisfy the employer’s burden 
under the second element of the defense.218  Finally, the Supreme Court 
made clear that no affirmative defense exists for the employer when the 
supervisor’s harassment causes the victim to experience a tangible 
adverse employment action.219  In Ellerth, the Supreme Court remanded 
the case to the district court to allow evidence to be introduced which 
might satisfy the proof necessary to establish a meritorious affirmative 
defense.220 
The plaintiff in Faragher, Beth Ann Faragher, was a college student 
who worked part-time as a lifeguard for the Marine Safety Section of the 
Parks and Recreation Department of the City of Boca Raton.221  Between 
1985 and 1990, two supervisors subjected her and other female lifeguards 
to sexually harassing behavior.222  Faragher did not complain about her 
employment circumstances to the City or the offending supervisors, 
although she did mention the problem to one superior she respected, but 
he did nothing.223  A couple of months before Faragher resigned, a female 
lifeguard who had previously been employed by the City wrote to its 
Personnel Director to complain that she and her co-workers had been 
harassed by these same supervisors.224  The City investigated and 
reprimanded the supervisors, making them elect between unpaid 
suspension or forfeiting annual leave benefits.225  Faragher resigned in 
June 1990, and sued the City in 1992 for sexual harassment, alleging that 
the supervisors had subjected her and the other female lifeguards to 
“‘uninvited and offensive touching,’ by lewd remarks, and by speaking of 
women in offensive terms.”226  She specifically alleged that one supervisor 
said he would never promote a woman to the rank of lieutenant and that 
                                                
217 Id. 
218 See id. at 765 (concluding that a failure to use a complaint procedure satisfies the burden 
of proof).  The Court recognized in this opinion that failing to use a complaint procedure is 
not an unreasonable failure when the victim is required to report to the harasser.  Id. at 748–
49. 
219 See id. at 765 (clarifying when affirmative defenses are unavailable). 
220 Id. at 766. 
221 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780. 
222 See id. (explaining Faragher’s harassment claim). 
223 See id. at 782 (clarifying that Faragher did not make an official complaint to her manager 
about the harassment). 
224 See id. at 783 (discussing that before Faragher resigned a former employee wrote the 
City Personnel Director that she was harassed by Terry and Silverman as well). 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 780 (internal citations omitted). 
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the other supervisor had asked her to choose between dating him or being 
subjected to cleaning toilets for a year.227 
The Supreme Court, in Faragher, reiterated that an employer may raise 
an affirmative defense to a hostile environment sexual harassment claim 
if it produced proof that:  “(a) the employer exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) 
[the aggrieved] employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the 
preventive or remedial opportunities.”228  The Supreme Court, however, 
concluded that while the City normally would be given an opportunity to 
raise this newly-described affirmative defense, the record in this case 
revealed that the City had entirely failed to disseminate its sexual 
harassment to its beach employees and that the City had made no attempt 
to monitor the conduct of its supervisors.229  In addition, the Supreme 
Court noted that the City’s policy contained no assurance that a 
supervisor being accused of harassment could be bypassed by the 
employee registering complaints, which could effectively foreclose a 
victim of harassment from having an alternative means of reporting the 
problem.230  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held as a matter of law that 
the City lacked any ability to show that it had exercised reasonable care to 
prevent the supervisors’ harassing conduct.231  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court observed that in contrast to an employer of a small workforce, who 
might reasonably believe that prevention of harassment could be achieved 
less formally, it could not reasonably have thought that efforts to preclude  
hostile environments in its many departments in distant locations could 
be effective without communicating a formal policy against harassment 
and providing an adequate complaint procedure.232 
Since the advent of the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense, it has been 
further evaluated by numerous federal courts, which have explained that 
the existence of the policy described by the Supreme Court in 1998 does 
not effectively constitute a “Get Out of Jail Free” card.233  For example, in 
Gorzynski v. Jet Blue Airways Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit decided that the ability of an employer to assert the affirmative 
                                                
227 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780 (describing the instance of harassment where Faragher was 
threatened with cleaning toilets if she did not date her lieutenant). 
228 Id. at 807. 
229 Id. at 808. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 See Get-Out-of-Jail-Free-Card, YOURDICTIONARY, http://www.yourdictionary.com/get-
out-of-jail-free-card#54PMoDjFMQCAGUuJ.99 [http://perma.cc/64H9-NEJN] (defining 
“get-out-of-jail-free” as “[a]n element of the board game Monopoly, which allows a player 
to leave the “jail” square immediately, without missing game turns”). 
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defense must be determined on a case-by-case basis.234  Indeed, there is 
currently a split among the federal judicial circuits regarding the second 
prong of the affirmative defense, with some courts concluding that the 
second prong of the affirmative defense is unfair to employers in single-
incident harassment situations because the affirmative defense is fact-
specific and to hold otherwise would impermissibly impose strict liability 
on employers.235  The Seventh Circuit has continued to apply both prongs 
in all situations.236 
Despite the circuit spilt about the application of the affirmative 
defense’s second prong, unanimity exists among the federal courts that 
employers who wish to avail themselves of the affirmative defense have a 
legal duty to:  (1) utilize a written policy which prohibits harassment in 
the workplace; (2) make the policy known to its workers; and (3) provide 
a means of recourse within the company.237  Yet, the NLRB has told 
employers that the use of language in a policy to prevent harassment is a 
violation of the NLRA.238  As recognized by the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, “the NLRB has ruled that policies ensuring confidentiality for 
employees in workplace investigations and prohibiting harassment 
somehow interfere with Section 7 rights.”239  The NLRB has served to put 
employers squarely “between a rock and a hard place.”240 This seems like 
                                                
234 See 596 F. 3d 93, 104–05 (2d Cir. 2010) (determining that affirmative defenses should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis).  In this case, the Second Circuit clarified that:  
[d]etermining whether a plaintiff has unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of the options provided in an employer’s sexual harassment 
policy is not as formulaic as JetBlue would have us hold.  Rather, it 
depends on the facts and circumstances of a given case and can, as it 
does here, raise a question for the jury. 
Id. 
235 See Natalie S. Neals, Flirting With the Law:  An Analysis of the Ellerth/Faragher Circuit 
Split and a Prediction of the Seventh Circuit’s Stance, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 166, 167 (2013) (explaining 
why some courts have moved away from applying the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher 
defense because the defense is fact specific and would impose strict liability unfairly on 
employers for single incidences of harassment). 
236 See id. at 207 (recognizing the Seventh Circuit’s continued application of the second 
prong of the Ellerth/Faragher defense). 
237 See id. at 195–96 (discussing the incentive for employers to create anti-harassment 
policies, distribute those policies to workers, and give workers workplace recourse for 
harassment).  
238 See U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Theater of the Absurd, https://www.uschamber.com/ 
sites/default/files/documents/files/nlrb_theater_of_the_absurd.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
ZM8Y-HVEY] (detailing the restrictions on policy language used by employers that violate 
the employees’ rights). 
239 See id. at 6–7. 
240 See Between a Rock and a Hard Place, GINGER (Jan. 1, 2013), 
http://www.gingersoftware.com/content/phrases/between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place/ 
#.WJdNz_krLIU [https://perma.cc/CW3F-JK4Z] (explaining the significance of the 
common phrase “between a rock and hard place).  The article states: 
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a particularly precarious place for an employer to be situated at the 
present time, since 2017 has proved to be a reawakening of the right of 
women to be free from sexual harassment in society. The last time this 
important topic played out on such a national level, Anita Hill, in 1991, 
was withstanding a grilling before Congress in connection with Justice 
Clarence Thomas’ confirmation hearing. The response to Professor Hill’s 
courageous efforts was a seventy-one percent increase in the number of 
sexual harassment claims filed with the EEOC in 1992.  Accordingly, 
employers will be well-served to have the recommended policy, even if it 
might meet with the disapproval of the NLRB.      
As mentioned, historically, the NLRB’s focus has been on unionized 
employers.241  While the NLRB has broadened its focus in recent times, the 
fact remains that all union employees are protected by the ability to assert 
their “Weingarten” rights, which stem from the Supreme Court’s decision 
in National Labor Relations Board v. J. Weingarten, Inc.242  In Weingarten, the 
company accused its employee, Laura Collins, of stealing.243  Collins was 
employed as a lunch-counter sales clerk for the J. Weingarten, Store No. 
98, in Houston, Texas, and one day she was interrogated by the manager 
                                                
The origin of the idiom ‘between a rock and a hard place’ can be found 
in ancient Greek mythology.  In Homer’s Odyssey, Odysseus must pass 
between Charybdis, a treacherous whirlpool, and Scylla, a horrid man-
eating, cliff-dwelling monster.  Ever since, saying one is stuck between 
a rock (the cliff) and a hard place (the whirlpool) has been a way to 
succinctly describe being in a dilemma. 
Id. 
241 See Michael Rybicki, The NLRB Continues To Go After Non-Union Employers in Industries 
it Has Historically Not Targeted, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW COUNSEL (Nov. 3, 2016), 
http://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2016/11/the-nlrb-continues-to-go-
after-non-union-employers-in-industries-it-has-historically-not-targeted/ 
[https://perma.cc/NTH3-X55F]. The article states:  
Although many employers (and some of their attorneys) think that the 
application of the National Labor Relations Act is limited to union-
represented employees or at least limited to union or union-related 
activities, such as collective bargaining, union organizing, or union 
strikes, hand billing, picketing, or boycotts, the Act’s coverage is much 
broader.  As the Board’s website notes:  The NLRA applies to most 
private sector employers, including manufacturers, retailers, private 
universities, and health care facilities.  Employees at union and non-
union workplaces have the right to help each other by sharing 
information, signing petitions and seeking to improve wages and 
working conditions in a variety of ways. 
Id. 
242 See 420 U.S. at 265–66 (explaining the rights of employees to have union representation 
during employer investigation interviews when the employee believes the interview might 
put the employee’s livelihood in jeopardy). 
243 Id. at 254. 
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and an undercover investigator employed by the company.244  The 
investigator had placed Collins under surveillance to look into a report 
that she was stealing money from the lunch counter cash register.245  While 
his investigation turned up no evidence of wrongdoing, the store manager 
had received a report from another employee that Collins “had purchased 
a box of chicken that sold for $2.98, but had placed only $1 in the cash 
register.”246  As a result, the company thought that Collins had taken a 
large box of chicken while only paying for a small box.247  Collins insisted 
that she took only the amount of chicken which customers receive in a 
small box, but used a large box because the store was out of small boxes.248  
As a result, Collins was not disciplined by her employer.249 
Collins was a member of the United Food and Commercial Workers 
International Union, Local 455.250  She asked several times during the 
interview for her union representative or the shop steward to be present, 
but the company did not grant her request.251  The company then 
instructed Collins to keep the interview to herself, but she informed her 
shop steward about the experience, after which the union filed an unfair 
labor practice charge against the company.252 
The Supreme Court ruled that an employee who is a member of a 
union is entitled to union representation for investigatory interviews.253  
The Supreme Court, therefore, determined that the company had 
committed an unfair labor practice.254  As a result of the Supreme Court’s 
decision, it became clear that a union employee is entitled to be 
represented by the union at an investigatory interview by the employer 
when the employee reasonably believes that the interview may lead to 
disciplinary action.255  These “Weingarten” rights provide that an 
                                                
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 254 (noting Collins’ testimony during the interview with her 
manager and the investigator). 
248 Id. 
249 See id. at 254 (describing the main issue of the case, that the employee was not given the 
right to have her union representative present during an interview in which she was being 
questioned about theft). 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 253. 
252 Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 256. 
253 Id. at 267. 
254 Id. at 256–57. 
255 Union employees often carry a “Weingarten” card.  See Weingarten Rights Card, ICWUC, 
http://www.icwuc.org/wp-content/uploads/weingartenrightscard.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CTW2-WFT7] (illustrating a sample Weingarten card).  The sample card 
reads as follows: 
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employee who reasonably believes that an investigatory interview could 
lead to discipline is entitled to ask for union representation.256  An 
investigatory interview is a meeting with management at which the 
employee will be questioned or asked to explain his or her conduct, and 
which could lead to disciplinary action against the employee.257 
Since the employee’s union representative is entitled to be present in 
such meetings, a protest can be immediately raised if there is any concern 
that the employer is infringing on the employee’s Section 7 rights.258  In 
other words, if a neutral employment policy designed to guide and protect 
the entire workforce is being applied in an unlawful manner, such a 
concern can be addressed at the very moment of application. This process 
obviates the need for the NLRB to issue blanket letters of guidance to its 
personnel about supposedly overbroad policies and issue Board rulings 
that eradicate the ability of employers to protect the workforce from 
bullies and harassers due to a hypothetical possibility of an exceedingly 
liberal construction of a conduct or communication rule.259 
Currently, non-union employees cannot assert the same 
“Weingarten” entitlement.260  One can reasonably expect, however, that 
                                                
If the discussion in this meeting could in any way lead to my being 
disciplined or terminated, or impact on my personal working 
conditions, I request that my steward, local officer or union 
representative be present.  Without union representation, I choose not 
to answer any further questions at this time. 
Id. 
256 See id. (addressing the statement made by the Weingarten card, that employees are 
allowed to bring their union representatives to interviews in which they reasonably believe 
could lead to discipline by the employer).  
257 See Weingarten Rights, https://www.umass.edu/usa/weingarten.htm 
[https://perma.cc/D2WN-NGAS] (defining investigatory interview as “one in which a 
Supervisor questions an employee to obtain information which could be used as a basis for 
discipline or asks an employee to defender his/her conduct.”). 
258 See  NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 267 (1975) (reiterating the rights of employees 
under section 7 to have their union representatives at investigatory interviews, which allows 
the representative to oversee the protection of employee rights during the investigation). 
259 See Jennifer Cluverius, Employers Beware:  NLRB Continues to Target Policies and 
Agreements, NEXSEN PRUET (June 4, 2013), http://mobile.nexsenpruet.com/ 
Employers_Beware [https://perma.cc/8YQW-SGJY] (contributing that the NLRB no longer 
needs to issue blanket letters to guide employers). 
260 See The NLRB Limits Weingarten Rights in Non Union Worksites, FINDLAW, 
http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/the-nlrb-limits-weingarten-rights-in-
non-union-worksites-but.html [https://perma.cc/85MR-PJFF] (elaborating on the limits of 
Weingarten Rights in the context of non-unionized employers).  The article states: 
One of the most common pitfalls for non-union employers during the 
past four years was the extension in 2000 of so called ‘Weingarten rights’ 
to non-union employees.  The U.S. Supreme Court in a 1975 decision in 
NLRB v. J. Weingarten Inc., required that employers grant union 
employee requests for a union representative to attend an investigatory 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss2/6
2018] NLRB’s Attack on Workplace Rules 439 
since the application of the rule can be tested by a union representative at 
an early stage, employers will be sensitive to the concept that neutral 
policies for the protection of all will not be used for an unlawful purpose 
through an overbroad application which encroaches on Section 7 rights.261  
In other words, the rules will be used to improve the workplace and not 
to inhibit protected communications.262 
IV.  BALANCING SECTION 7 CONCERNS AND EMPLOYER RIGHTS 
To the extent the NLRB remains concerned about an employee’s 
potentially overbroad reading of the plain language of a workplace 
conduct rule, such as “be respectful” to other employees, one would do 
well to consider elementary concepts of statutory interpretation which 
apply in all courts.263  Legal cases cannot be decided in a vacuum.264  There 
is no utility in permitting the NLRB to negate the efforts of employers to 
guide and control the workforce through its own broad interpretations of 
                                                
interview that might lead to discipline of the employee.  In July 2000, 
the NLRB ruled that non-union employees could request the presence 
of a co-worker at an investigatory interview.  On June 9, 2004, the NLRB 
reversed its position for the fourth time in the past 22 years, announcing 
‘that the Weingarten right does not extend to a workplace where . . . the 
employees are not represented by a union.’[]  According to the Board’s 
3-2 decision, ‘the right of an employee to a co-worker’s presence in the 
absence of a union is outweighed by an employer’s right to conduct 
prompt, efficient, thorough and confidential workplace investigations.’  
The policy concerns guiding the Board’s recent split decision include a 
practical recognition of changing patterns in the workplace, such as ‘the 
rise in the need for investigatory interviews . . . particularly laws 
addressing workplace discrimination and harassment,’ and ‘because of 
the events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath.’ 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
261 See Interfering with Employee Rights Section 7 and 8, FINDLAW https://www.nlrb.gov/ 
rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/interfering-employee-rights-section-7-8a1 
[https://perma.cc/85MR-PJFF] (discussing how employers must be conscious of not 
encroaching on employers Section 7 rights).  Despite the historical application of Weingarten 
rights to only union workers, on December 1, 2016, the Associate General Counsel of the 
NLRB issued an Advice Memorandum to Regional Director of NLRB Region 6 to use then 
pending cases as a vehicle to extend Weingarten rights to a non-union setting.  Id. 
262 See Robert Baror, Employer Policies and the NLRA: How Handbook Provisions Can Violate 
Employee Rights, BAROR LAW, http://barorlaw.com/global_pictures/Labouring%20Oar 
%20-%20Just%20Article.pdf (2016) [https://perma.cc/FD3K-HUWC] (explaining that 
employers have rights to communications that the workplace policies may not prohibit, but 
that the workplace policies must work to protect employees  and keep the workplace safe). 
263 See id. (restating the idea that some workplace provisions may be found to be too broad 
by the NLRB and thus considered to have a chilling effect on workers’ rights in the 
workplace). 
264 See Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 88 (1977) (noting the court’s statement that law must 
be taken in context). 
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language with no attention to the context of the rule, despite its hollow 
assurances to the contrary. 
One statutory interpretation tool is noscitur a sociis, which in Latin 
means “it is known by the company it keeps.”265  This is a legal maxim that 
permits the meaning of an unclear word or phrase to be determined in the 
context of the words or phrases which accompany it.266  As United 
Kingdom Judge J. Stamp explained in Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd., 
“[s]entences are not mere collections of words to be taken out of the 
sentence, defined separately by reference to the dictionary or decided 
cases, and then put back into the sentence with the meaning you have 
assigned to them as separate words.”267  More recently, on our side of the 
pond, this canon of construction has been described as follows:  “Under 
this canon, the meaning of an ambiguous word is determined by its 
context.  The Supreme Court has applied this canon to ‘avoid giving one 
word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying 
words, thus giving unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.’”268 
The canon of construction related to noscitur a sociis is known as 
ejusdem generis, which may be even more useful to the NLRB in assessing 
the true meaning and intent of a workplace conduct rule.269  The Latin 
phrase ejusdem generis means that words should be construed in the 
context of the other words in a rule or law that are “of a like kind.”270  The 
Supreme Court, applying this canon, has explained, “Where general 
words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general 
words are [usually] construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to 
                                                
265 What is Noscitur Sociis, LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictionary.org/noscitur-a-
sociis/ [https://perma.cc/VJ56-2EAY]. 
266 See Kaushalya Kumari, Principles of “Ejusdem Generis”–”Noscitur a Sociis” in Taxation 
Law, TOP  CA FIRMS (Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.topcafirms.com/index.php/white-
paper/5716-principles-of-ejusdem-generis-noscitur-a-sociis-in-taxation-laws 
[https://perma.cc/8J32-5YU4?type=image] (describing the interplay between ejusdem 
generis and noscutor a sociis and how ejudem generis is used when the meaning of a law is 
unclear). 
267 See Definition of Noscitur a sociis, BUSINESS DICTIONARY, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/noscitur-a-sociis.html [https://perma.cc/ 
GZR4-U2H8].  
268 In re Nance, 371 B.R. 358, 365 n. 8 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd 
Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995). 
269 See Ejusdem Generis, BUSINESS DICTIONARY, http://www.yourdictionary.com/ 
ejusdem-generis [https://perma.cc/P8G4-BQB3] (“Of the same kind, class, or nature. In 
statutory construction, the “ejusdem generis rule” is that where general words follow an 
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such 
general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying 
only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned”). 
270 See id. (describing the constructions of ejusdem generis). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 2 [2018], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss2/6
2018] NLRB’s Attack on Workplace Rules 441 
those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.”271  As a result, 
this canon ordinarily limits general terms which follow specific ones to 
matters similar to those specified.272 
These canons of construction should authorize the NLRB to easily 
realize the context of the terms used in employers’ workplace rules to 
appreciate that, in context, such rules are meant to preserve order and 
protect the nations’ workforce.273  Only by ignoring these established 
maxims can the Board conclude that innocuous language would be read so 
broadly by employees that they will be fearful about an encroachment on 
their Section 7 rights.274 
The law of contracts provides another means of determining the true 
intent of particular language.275  The interpretation of a contract is deemed 
to be an issue of law.276  This means that the tribunal has the authority to 
                                                
271 See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1086 (2015) (quoting Washington State Dept. 
of Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 553 U.S. 371, 384, (2003)).  In 
Yates, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the captain of a 
fishing boat was properly convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.S. § 1519 because he instructed a 
member of his crew to throw undersized fish they caught overboard rather than complying 
with an order issued by a Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission Officer who 
had been deputized as a federal agent which required Captain Yates to segregate the 
undersized fish from other fish and return with them to port.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
reversed the federal appellate court on the basis that § 1519 applied only to objects that were 
used to record or preserve information, and “not all objects in the physical world.”  Id.  Thus, 
it did not include fish.  Id. 
272 See Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936) (continuing to explain how the canon 
works in the context of cases, and the technical structure what the canon allows). 
273 Cf. id. 
274 See Katherine M. Scott, Note, When is Employee Blogging Protected by Section 7 of the 
NLRA?, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 6–7 (2006) (emphasizing how language can cause one to 
feel hopeful as opposed to fearful).  Although the tenor of the language seems to be a factor 
in the analysis, several appellate courts and the NLRB have found employee speech 
protected even when that speech uses harsh language.  Id.  Thus, many variables factor into 
whether employees fear that seemingly harmless language is capable of infringing upon 
their Section 7 rights.  Id. 
275 See Patrick S. Ottinger, Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 60 LA. L. REV. 765, 766 
(2000) (discussing how the most important aspect of interpreting a contract is understanding 
the intent of the parties). 
276 See Colburn v. Tr. of Ind. Univ., 739 F. Supp. 1268, 1291 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (concluding that 
the interpretation, construction, or legal effect of a contract is to be determined by the court 
as a question of law).  See also Colburn v. Trustees of Indiana University, 739 F. Supp. 1268, 
1291 (S.D. Ind. 1990), which explains how Indiana courts have adopted the Indiana Law 
Encyclopedia’s summary of contract interpretation: 
As a general rule the interpretation, construction or legal effect of a 
contract is a matter to be determined by the court as a question of law.  
This rule has been frequently announced as applicable when the 
contract involved is written, and, likewise, the rule has been applied 
where the contract is clear and unambiguous.  On the other hand, the 
broad general rule is frequently laid down that the construction of a 
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conclude what the terms of the document were intended to accomplish.277  
“The ‘cardinal rule’ of contract interpretation requires a court to ‘ascertain 
the parties’ intention and give effect to that intention when legal principles 
so allow.’”278  “Reasonable rather than unreasonable interpretations of 
contracts are favored, and accordingly, interpretations which lead to 
absurdity or negate the purpose of the contract should be avoided.”279  
Based on this rule, when discerning the meaning of a contact’s language, 
all terms of the agreement should be read in harmony with the plain 
meaning.280 
This rule of interpretation does not impose an ominous burden on the 
decision maker.281  All the rule requires is that all of the words in the 
provision be construed in harmony with each other and in context.282  
Since the NLRB has elected to scrutinize employers’ rules and policies for 
potential violations of employees’ Section 7 rights, it should accept a duty 
to exercise some discretion and analyze the rules in harmony and in the 
context of the purpose for which they were issued.283  The NLRB purports 
                                                
contract is for the jury where the terms of the contract are ambiguous 
and their meaning is to be determined from extrinsic evidence.  Further, 
it has been held that where extraneous facts and circumstances are 
resorted to explain an ambiguous or uncertain contract, the question of 
construction is one of mixed law and fact.  Strictly speaking, however, 
the interpretation of a contract is not submitted to the jury; insofar as the 
question is one of construction, it is always a question of law, although 
the facts on which the construction rests must be determined by the jury.  
Thus, it has been indicated that the construction of an ambiguous 
contract is a question of law for the court where the ambiguity arises by 
reason of the language used and not because of extrinsic facts.  Likewise, 
where the contract is in question, it is the duty of the jury to find the 
facts, and for the court to say whether the contract is executed or 
executory. 
Id. (quoting 6 Indiana Law Encyclopedia § 137 (1980)). 
277 See id. at 1287 (discussing how courts, the equivalent of tribunals, are free to determine 
what the terms of a contract are intended to accomplish if no ambiguity in the terms exists).   
278 In re Tabares, No. 08-40324, WL 5539808, at *1 (Bankr. D. Kan. Dec. 15, 2008). 
279 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
280 See id. (stating the previous rule that reasonable interpretations of contracts are 
favored).  See also Wooddale, Inc. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 378 F.2d 627, 630 (8th Cir. 
1967) (summarizing that courts should consider the contractual language of a contract in 
harmony with its plain meaning).  
281 See In re Tabares, WL 5539808, at *2 (holding that unambiguous contracts are enforced 
per the terms in the contract and courts should never rewrite or insert term under the guise 
of interpretation). 
282 Id. at *1. 
283 See Michael J. Westcott, Are Employer Codes of Conduct Meaningless in Today’s NLRB 
Climate?, WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER (Apr. 22, 2015), 
http://www.hrhero.com/hl/articles/2015/04/22/are-employer-codes-of-conduct-
meaningless-in-todays-nlrb-climate/ [https://perma.cc/J7WZ-U283] (emphasizing that 
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to afford employers such deference, but its rulings to date have not lived 
up to that promise.284 
V.  RULES OF CONDUCT ARE IMPERATIVE 
The federal government does understand that workplace rules are 
necessary for order and safety.285  For example, in 2011, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) adopted a safety program for 
its own workforce, which includes a workplace anti-bullying policy.286  
Congress created OSHA to ensure safe and healthful working conditions 
by establishing and enforcing standards, and through training, outreach, 
education and assistance.287  “OSHA is part of the United States 
Department of Labor.”288  
The OSHA workplace anti-bully policy is contained in the OSHA Field 
Health and Safety Manual which was released on May 23, 2011.289  The 
manual provides safety practices for all OSHA field offices.290 It is 
noteworthy that the document was drafted in cooperation with the 
National Council of Field Labor Locals, a union that represents OSHA 
                                                
broad or ambiguous codes of conduct or company values statements will be weighed against 
the employer as opposed to the employees who are charged with obeying them).  
284 See id. (concluding that employers often draft codes of conduct or rules of business 
etiquette in terms of employer expectations, however, this practice often weighs against the 
employer because it violates employees Section 7 rights, which is investigated by the NLRA).  
285 See Government Regulation of Safety In the Workplace, BIZ FILINGS, 
https://www.bizfilings.com/toolkit/research-topics/office-hr/government-regulation-of-
safety-in-the-workplace [https://www.perma.cc/7SGE-DSSD] (stating that the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act was enacted to address the uneven patchwork of 
workplace safety state laws and its federal regulations are beneficial for both employers and 
employees). 
286 See Patricia Barnes, OSHA Adopts Workplace Anti-Bullying Policy, WHEN THE ABUSER 
GOES TO WORK BLOG (June 2, 2011), http://www.abusergoestowork.com/ohsa-adopts-
workplace-anti-bullying-policy/ [https://perma.cc/PSE4-LTBS] (agreeing that the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration has adopted a safety program for its own 
workers that includes a workplace anti-bullying policy).  
287 See About OHSA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.osha.gov/about.html 
[https://perma.cc/28R8-N6DJ] (discussing how OSHA was created to set and enforce 
standards that assure safe and healthful working conditions for employees).  
288 Id. 
289 See OSHA Field Safety and Health Manual, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 
ADMINISTRATION (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/ 
ADM_04-00-001.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GHB-VBYC] (stating that no employee shall 
engage in bullying).  
290  See id. at 161 (stating that the program applies to all staff of the OSHA’s Field offices).  
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workers.291  This is important because the NLRB’s scrutiny of a particular 
employer’s workplace policies often follows the sequence of a union filing 
an unfair labor practice charge challenging the discipline or discharge of 
a union worker and then turning over all of the employer’s rules and 
policies for review, even when the rules and policies have nothing to do 
with the charge.292  Yet, the union for OSHA field officers simultaneously 
endorses anti-harassment rules for its own workers.293 
OSHA’s workplace bullying policy tracks with the General Duty 
Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, which requires 
employers to “furnish to each of his employees employment and a place 
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing 
or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his 
employees . . . . ” 294  OSHA’s workplace bullying policy, a component of 
its manual’s “Violence in the Workplace” chapter, is intended:  “To 
provide a workplace that is free from violence, harassment, intimidation, 
and other disruptive behavior.”295  According to OSHA’s manual, 
“intimidating behavior” is defined as:  “Threats or other conduct that in 
any way create a hostile environment, impair Agency operations, or 
frighten, alarm or inhibit others.  Verbal intimidation may include making 
false statements that are malicious, disparaging, derogatory, disrespectful, 
abusive, or rude.”296  The OSHA manual defines workplace violence as  
“[a]n action, whether verbal, written, or physical aggression, that is 
intended to control, cause, or is capable of causing injury to oneself or 
other, emotional harm, or damage to property.”297 
Based on OSHA’s workplace conduct policy, this federal agency 
requires its employees to:   
[T]reat all other employees, as well as customers, with 
dignity and respect.  Management will provide a working 
environment as safe as possible by having preventative 
measures in place and by dealing immediately with 
                                                
291 See National Council of Field Labor Locals AFGE/AFL-CIO, NCFLL (Aug. 21, 2017), 
http://www.ncfll.org/ [https://perma.cc/FT7G-2382] (summarizing that the American 
Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) is the largest federal employee union). 
292 See Investigate Charges, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (Aug. 24, 2017), 
https://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges [https://perma.cc/7WF5-F27Z] 
(stating that the NLRB investigates thousands of charges annually by gathering relevant 
evidence and participating in hearings before NLRB Administrative Law Judges). 
293 See Barnes, supra note 286 (stating that OSHA adopted its own safety program that 
includes a workplace ant-bullying policy). 
294 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2012). 
295 Barnes, supra note 286. 
296 Id. 
297 Id. 
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threatening or potentially violent situations.  No 
employee will engage in threats, violent outbursts, 
intimidations, bullying harassment, or other abusive or 
disruptive behaviors.298 
According to the OSHA manual, the Assistant Regional 
Administrator/Director for Administrative Programs or the equivalent 
unit is required to: 
(1) Disseminate the workplace violence policies and 
procedures to all employees; 
(2) Provide annual training on this policy and U.S. 
Department of Labor workplace violence program for 
responsible OSHA Manager(s); and 
(3) Conduct an investigation and complete a Workplace 
Violence Incident Report for all incidents reported.  The 
report will be submitted to the Regional Administrator 
within 24 hours of completion.299 
Both OSHA and the union that helped formulate the workplace anti-
bullying policy are to be applauded for implementing a policy to guide 
and protect the workforce.  Workplace violence is an epidemic in this 
nation.300  According to OSHA, “[n]early 2 million American workers 
report having been victims of workplace violence each year.”301  OSHA 
believes as follows: 
In most workplaces where risk factors can be identified, 
the risk of assault can be prevented or minimized if 
employers take appropriate precautions.  One of the best 
protections employers can offer their workers is to establish a 
zero-tolerance policy toward workplace violence.  This policy 
should cover all workers, patients, clients, visitors, 
                                                
298 Id. 
299 Barnes, supra note 286. 
300 See Sandy Smith, Nurses Testify for National Standard to Prevent Workplace Violence in 
Healthcare Settings, EHS TODAY (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.ehstoday.com/osha/nurses-
testify-national-standard-prevent-workplace-violence-healthcare-settings 
[https://perma.cc/QH7V-8NWP] (stating that workplace violence in healthcare settings are 
at epidemic levels and OSHA regulations are vital to protecting nurses and healthcare 
workers, as well as their patients, from the epidemic of workplace violence). 
301 Workplace Violence, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR:  OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/workplaceviolence/ 
[https://perma.cc/7HK7-V6W8]. 
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contractors, and anyone else who may come in contact 
with company personnel. 
 
By assessing their worksites, employers can identify 
methods for reducing the likelihood of incidents 
occurring.  OSHA believes that a well-written and 
implemented workplace violence prevention program, 
combined with engineering controls, administrative 
controls and training can reduce the incidence of workplace 
violence in both the private sector and federal workplaces. 
 
This can be a separate workplace violence prevention program 
or can be incorporated into a safety and health program, 
employee handbook, or manual of standard operating 
procedures.  It is critical to ensure that all workers know 
the policy and understand that all claims of workplace 
violence will be investigated and remedied promptly.  In 
addition, OSHA encourages employers to develop 
additional methods as necessary to protect employees in 
high risk industries.302  
In fact, on January 11, 2017, OSHA announced that it is starting efforts 
to establish a national standard to protect health care and social assistance 
employees from workplace violence.303  OHSA’s interest in developing 
rules to reduce the significant risk of workplace violence for this segment 
of the workforce comes in response to a petition filed by a group of labor 
unions in July 2016 “advocating that the agency pursue a formal standard 
to mandate that healthcare employers take appropriate actions to protect 
their workers.”304  Unions previously pursued the same protection in 
California, which led to the adoption of the first workplace violence 
                                                
302  Id. (emphasis added). 
303 See Gloria Gonzalez, OSHA Focuses on Workplace Violence Standard for Health Sector, 
BUSINESS INSURANCE (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/ 
20170111/NEWS08/912311363/OSHA-focuses-on-workplace-violence-standard-for-
health-care-social-service-sector [https://perma.cc/B7FG-QV93] (discussing OSHA’s rule-
making, which is intended to protect healthcare and social assistance workers from 
workplace violence nationwide). 
304  Id. 
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prevention standard for health care workers in the country.305  Workplace 
violence is a concern of organized labor, as it should be.306 
The problem should now be plain to see.  While OSHA recognizes the 
importance of addressing various sources of workplace violence and 
rightfully now requires its own employees to act with dignity and respect 
toward co-workers, a responsible private sector employer that tried to 
utilize a similar policy for the guidance and protection of its workers was 
found by the NLRB to have violated its employees’ Section 7 rights.307  
Specifically, as referenced above, in Care One at Madison Avenue, LLC d/b/a 
Care One at Madison Avenue, a union initiated an organizing campaign at 
one of the employer’s facilities to attempt to unionize a segment of the 
workforce.308  Once a sufficient number of authorization cards were signed 
                                                
305  See Joyce Famakinwa, California’s Health Care Employers Prepare for Workplace Violence 
Rule, BUSINESS INSURANCE  (Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.businessinsurance.com/ 
article/20170102/STORY/912311197?template=printart [https://perma.cc/C2GN-YVLW] 
(discussing how the murder of psychiatric technician, Donna Gross, by a patient attracted 
attention to the dangers faced by health care employees). 
306 See Workplace Violence, supra note 301 (detailing how 403 workplace homicides occurred 
in 2014 and how such instances are major concerns for employers and employees 
nationwide). 
307 See Barnes, supra note 286 (stating that all OSHA employees are required to “treat all 
other employees, as well as customers, with dignity and respect”).  See also Kelsey Basten, 
NLRB Rules Employer Memo Violates NLRA, GOV. DOCS. (Jan. 16, 2015), 
https://www.govdocs.com/nlrb-rules-employer-memo-violates-nlra/ [https://perma.cc/ 
27C7-LQFH] (ruling that a sign requesting employees get along with each other days after a 
turbulent union election violated NLRB rules). 
308 See 832 F.3d 351, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (stating that employer allegedly committed a series 
of unfair labor practices, in violation of National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), in an effort to 
prevent certification of a union at its nursing home and rehabilitation facility).  
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by the workers in the targeted bargaining unit, the NLRB conducted an 
election.309  The union lost the election by one vote.310  
It is particularly easy to appreciate in this day and age, given the 
spectacle our country just witnessed during the national election for 
president, that hard feelings might result from the hard fought battle over 
whether the workers should unionize, and Care One management sensed 
that was the case among its employees.311  Accordingly, the facility’s 
administrator posted a memo about “Teamwork and Dignity and 
Respect.”312  The administrator addressed reports of hostility and even 
threats of violence by calling on employees to treat each other with 
“respect and dignity.”313  The administrator communicated as follows:  “I 
want everyone to be on notice that threats, intimidation, and harassment 
will not be tolerated at Care One Madison Avenue.  We will enforce the 
Workplace Violence Prevention Policy to keep our workplace free from 
such improper conduct.”314  In response to the administrator’s call for 
                                                
309 See Conduct Elections, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD https://www.nlrb.gov/ 
what-we-do/conduct-elections [https://perma.cc/DH4H-MNHP] (detailing required steps 
to start the NLRB election process).  In full, the election process can be defined as follows: 
To start the election process, a petition and associated documents must 
be filed, preferably electronically, with the nearest NLRB Regional 
Office showing support for the petition from at least 30% of employees. 
NLRB agents will then investigate to make sure the Board has 
jurisdiction, the union is qualified, and there are no existing labor 
contracts or recent elections that would bar an election. Shortly after the 
petition is filed, the employer is required to post a Notice of Petition for 
Election in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to 
employees are customarily posted. If the employer customarily 
communicates with employees in the petitioned-for unit through 
electronic means, the employer must also distribute the Notice of 
Petition for Election electronically to those employees. The NLRB agents 
will seek an election agreement between the employer, union, and other 
parties setting the date, time, and place for balloting, the ballot 
language(s), the appropriate unit, and a method to determine who is 
eligible to vote. Once an agreement is reached, the parties authorize the 
NLRB Regional Director to conduct the election. If no agreement is 
reached, the Regional Director will hold a hearing and then may order 
an election and set the conditions in accordance with the Board’s rules 
and its decisions. Typically, elections are held on the earliest practicable 
date after a Director’s order or authorization, which will vary from case 
to case. 
Id. 
310 See Care One at Madison Ave., 832 F.3d at 356 (discussing how the union ultimately lost 
the vote). 
311 Id. at 356. 
312  Id. 
313 Id.  
314  N.L.R.B. v. Care One at Madison Avenue, LLC D/B/A Care One at Madison Avenue, 
2014 WL 7339612, at *2 (2014).  He went on to say that “employees have a right to make up 
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dignity and respect, the SEIU filed an unfair labor practice charge with the 
NLRB, after which the Board ruled that the employer’s actions of posting 
the memo with its Workplace Violence Prevention Policy amounted to 
retaliation against workers who engaged in legitimate union activity 
protected under Section 7 of the NLRA.315  The basis for the Board’s 
decision was that employees seeing the memo cautioning them to refrain 
from violence, intimidation, and harassment and directing them to treat 
each other with dignity and respect would “reasonably” be interpreted it 
as prohibiting union organizing activities.316  According to the NLRB’s 
approach, the employer was required to remain silent in the face of a 
palpable danger and hope for the best.317  OSHA would disagree with that 
ineffective, “turn a blind eye” approach.318  The same can safely be said 
for Herzberg, Maslow, and any of the employees at Care One who were 
                                                
their own minds regarding the union” and that he “respect[ed] the right employees have to 
be for or against the union,” but cautioned that those rights “do not give anyone the right to 
threaten or intimidate another team member, for any reason.”  Id.  Arezzo attached to the 
memorandum Care One’s pre-existing Workplace Violence Prevention policy.  Id.  There was 
in fact no evidence of any threats or intimidation, or even reports thereof, leaving employees 
to wonder what communications or activities surrounding the union representation election 
the management thought the referenced disciplinary policy encompassed.”  Care One at 
Madison Ave., LLC, 832 F.3d 351, at 356. 
315 See Theater of the Absurd: The NLRB Takes on the Employee Handbook, supra note 238 
(discussing that the memo filed by the facility’s administrator went against legitimate union 
activity that is protected under the NLRA). 
316 See id. (noting how the employees at Care One Madison would interpret the memo). 
317 See N.L.R.B. v. Care One at Madison Avenue, LLC D/B/A Care One at Madison 
Avenue, 832 F.3d 351, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reasoning that the workplace violence prevention 
policy was in violation of the NLRA because could reasonably be interpreted as a threat to 
lawful protected union activity). 
318 See, e.g., Gonzalez, supra note 303 (explaining the intent of OSHA’s rule-making to 
protect healthcare and social assistance workers from workplace violence).  See also The 
Meaning and Origin of the Expression: Turn a Blind Eye, THE PHRASE FINDER (Aug. 26, 2017), 
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/turn-a-blind-eye.html [https://perma.cc/X3HC-
9DFD] (“To knowingly refuse to acknowledge something which you know to be real.”).  
British Admiral Horatio Nelson is reported to have willfully disobeyed a signal to withdraw 
from a naval engagement in the battle of Copenhagen in 1801, as the British fleet attacked a 
joint Danish/Norwegian enemy.  Id.  The British fleet commander, Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, 
signaled with flags for Admiral Nelson to disengage, but the admiral was convinced of 
impending victory, so he ‘turned a blind eye’ to the signal. Id.  Admiral Nelson’s actual words 
at the time were:  [Putting the glass to his blind eye], “You know, Foley, I have only one 
eye—and I have a right to be blind sometimes . . . I really do not see the signal.”  Id.  In the 
form used today, the first apparent use is found in More letters from Martha Wilmot: impressions 
of Vienna, 1819–1829.  Id.  These letters were reprinted in 1935, with the quote being sent by 
Ms. Wilmot in 1823: “turn a blind eye and a deaf ear every now and then, and we get on 
marvelously (sic) well.”  Id. 
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unable to rely on their employer to help them to feel safe and secure in the 
workplace.319 
OSHA is not the only federal agency acting with more prudence than 
the NLRB would appear to allow.320  A further example of the 
inconsistency between the NLRB’s position and that of another agency of 
the federal government may be found in a policy issued by the 
Department of the Interior on December 28, 2011.321  At that time, the 
Director of the National Park Service issued an order in connection with 
the agency’s Anti-Harassment Policy.322  This policy specifically provides, 
in part, that: 
The National Park Service is committed to a workplace 
free of discrimination and harassment based on sex, 
gender identity, race, color, religion, age, national origin, 
sexual orientation, disability, genetic information and/or 
reprisal. Offensive sexual or non-sexual harassing 
behavior against any employee will not be tolerated.  
Therefore, the Service will take immediate and appropriate 
action when it is made aware of allegations of harassment or it 
determines that harassing conduct has occurred. Any 
employee who engages in sexual or non-sexual 
harassment will be subject to disciplinary action up to 
removal or termination.323 
In plain English, this federal employer utilizes a rule which prohibits 
harassment in the workplace.324  The purpose of the Director’s order was 
to update the anti-harassment policy of the National Park Service, 
establish procedures for addressing allegations of harassment, and 
identify the roles and responsibilities of agency employees, managers, and 
supervisors, as well as the Offices of Equal Employment Opportunity and 
Human Resources Management.325  The Director explained that his Order 
                                                
319 See Care One at Madison Avenue, LLC, 832 F.3d at 363 (giving context to support the 
assertion that CareOne employers did not provide a safe and secure workplace). 
320 See generally Director’s Order on National Park Service Anti-Harassment Policy, UNITED 
STATES DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE (2011), https://www.nps.gov/ 
policy/DOrders/DO_16F.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ9K-22XF] (providing the National Park 
Service’s Anti-Harassment Policy).  
321  See id. (providing documentation to show another agency position). 
322 See id. (detailing the National Park Service’s order). 
323 Id. (emphasis added). 
324 See id. (interpreting the Director’s language). 
325  See id. (explaining the purposed of the Order). 
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was intended to support the agency’s goal of maintaining a workplace that 
remained free of harassment and discrimination.326  
It is inconceivable that numerous government agencies understand 
the importance of rules to control and protect employees while another 
agency which exists to advance worker’s rights frowns upon such 
responsible efforts and concludes that they are unlawful infringements on 
an employee’s Section 7 rights.327  With all due respect to the NLRB’s 
efforts, the right to a safe and secure workplace is paramount. The NLRB’s 
enforcement of the Section 7 rights of workers to engage in protected, 
concerted activity through an overbroad interpretation of the plain 
language contained in workplace rules of conduct deprives employers of 
the ability to ensure decorum and safety in the work environment.328  This 
                                                
326 See Director’s Order on National Park Service Anti-Harassment Policy, supra note 320 
(describing that the purpose and goals is to update the anti-harassment policy). 
327 Compare N.L.R.B. v. Care One at Madison Avenue, LLC D/B/A Care One at Madison 
Avenue, 832 F.3d 351, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding an employer to be in violation of the 
NLRA for enacting a workplace violence policy because it was seen as being reasonably 
related to preventing protected union activity) with Barnes, supra note 286 (providing an 
example of an agency that protects employees with a workplace violence policy). 
328 The concern is real, not hypothetical.  In Pier Sixty LLC and Evelyn Gonzalez, 362 N.L.R.B. 
No. 59 (Mar. 31, 2015), an employee was permitted to use extreme profanity toward a 
supervisor and keep his job because the NLRB concluded that the termination of the 
employee violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.  Id.  Some of the company’s 
employees had expressed interest in joining a union because they thought that managers 
were treating them in a disrespectful and undignified manner.  Id.  Two days before the 
union election, a long-time employee, who was working at a fundraising event, became 
upset what he felt was his supervisor’s disrespectful tone and comments towards the wait 
staff.  Id.  He went on break and posted a Facebook message that said:  “Bob is such a NASTY 
MOTHER [expletive] don’t know how to talk to people!!!!!!  [Expletive] his mother and his 
entire [expletive] family!!!!  What a LOSER!!!!  Vote YES for the UNION!!!!!!!” Id.  The post 
was visible to the worker’s Facebook friends, including some coworkers.  Id.  The employee 
deleted the post following the union election, but was fired. In evaluating the posting, the 
NLRB considered the following factors: 
(1) whether the record contained any evidence of the employer’s 
antiunion hostility; 
(2) whether the employer provoked the employee’s conduct; 
(3) whether the employee’s conduct was impulsive or deliberate; 
(4) the location of the Facebook post; 
(5) the subject matter of the post; 
(6) the nature of the post; 
(7) whether the employer considered language similar to that used by 
the employee to be offensive; 
(8) whether the employer maintained a specific rule prohibiting the 
language at issue; and 
(9) whether the discipline imposed upon the employee was typical of 
that imposed for similar violations or disproportionate to his 
offense. 
Id.  The NLRB then indicated that, viewing the evidence “objectively,” none of the factors 
weighed in favor of finding that the employee’s comments were so egregious as to take them 
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tradeoff makes no sense and should not be permitted to continue.329  
Protecting speech at the expense of employee safety and security cannot 
have been the intent of Senator Wagner and all those who were 
contributing authors of the NLRA in 1935.330 
In order to study the situation from still another perspective, the 
values espoused by the United States Army are useful.331  The Army’s 
                                                
outside the protection of the NLRA, so the termination violated the employee’s Section 7 
rights.  Id.  This ruling would seem to constitute a preposterous over-application of a 
regulation designed to protect “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid 
and protection.”  Id.  Notably, on April 21, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit granted the Board’s application for enforcement and denied the employer’s cross-
petition for review, albeit with a recognition that the line for what constituted unprotected 
conduct was close.  Taking into account past conduct of workers which had not been 
similarly sanctioned, the appellate court stated: 
In sum, Pier Sixty has failed to meet its burden of showing that Perez’s 
behavior was so egregious as to lose the protection of the NLRA under 
the Board’s ‘totality of the circumstances’ test. However, we note that 
this case seems to us to sit at the outer-bounds of protected, union-
related comments, and any test for evaluating opprobrious conduct 
must be sufficiently sensitive to employers’ legitimate disciplinary 
interests, as we have previously cautioned. We have considered all of 
Pier Sixty’s objections to enforcement and have found them to be 
without merit. 
NLRB v. Pier Sixty, 855 F. 3d 115, 125 (2nd Cir. 2017).  It is striking that the Second Circuit’s 
ruling about what type of language is in bounds in the workplace and protected by the NLRA 
is, in part, a product of the barrage of profanity to which we, as a society, have become 
accustomed.  Id.  It seems we are numb to the aggression and rudeness which pervades our 
lives through cinema, television, and various forms of social media.  Although the 
broadcasting of “any . . . indecent . . . language” continues to be prohibited by 18 U. S. 
C. § 1464, including references to sexual or excretory activities or organs—see FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (2009)—and the Supreme Court, in FCC v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 
U.S. 502 (1978), in a 5-4 decision, upheld the ban on the seven words contained in the late 
comedian George Carlin’s monologue, the amount of offensive dialogue to which we are 
exposed appears to have desensitized us to the vulgarities contained in mainstream media 
and primetime entertainment.  While this author would be hypocritical, based on other 
reasoning offered in this Article, in suggesting any form of censorship, the hope remains that 
employers will regain the legal right to guide their workforce and possess the authority to 
require that the individuals whom they provided gainful employment act with common 
decency and civility in the workplace. After all, there is the message, which must be 
protected by the NLRA, and then there is the delivery, which should be subject to some 
modicum of control to ensure a work environment that is palatable for all. 
329 See Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 NLRB No. 59 at *2 (suggesting the NLRB’s enforcement of 
Section 7 rights contradicts ensuring workplace safety). 
330 Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (establishing that the foremost policy concern was outright 
banning of unionization by some employers). 
331 The author has the utmost respect for all who are serving and have served in our armed 
forces, some of whom have made the ultimate sacrifice.  The comparisons in this section of 
the Article are for the purpose of making a point about the propriety of certain core values 
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values are “Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Integrity, Personal 
Courage and Honor.”332    Of course, the Values of Honor, Integrity and 
Personal Courage, which are at the core of every soldier, also are welcome 
in a public or private workplace setting. Indeed, those values are 
imperative in any quality workplace, where employers must be able to 
invoke policies and rules to insist on an environment that fosters dignity 
and respect.    
It is evident from the Army’s stated values that the military 
emphasizes discipline and order, prioritizes the group over any 
individual, and requires compliance through enforced rules. The Army 
recognizes that in order for the institution to be effective, individuals must 
be required to treat others with dignity and respect.333  As we have seen, 
however, the NLRB believes that a rule requiring employees to treat 
others with dignity and respect is an unlawful infringement on Section 7 
rights. 334  This conclusion defies logic and reason. 
Finally, the Army, through the values and the conduct requirements 
it enforces to assure that military personnel act accordingly, evidently 
embraces a profound concept attributable to Aristotle.335  It was Aristotle’s 
philosophy the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.336  Thus, in 
addition to the considerations expressed earlier in this article that workers 
must feel safe and secure in the workplace before they can be expected to 
perform, it is equally true that rules and policies are absolutely necessary 
                                                
in our nation’s places of employment, and not to specifically compare those environments 
with the environments into which our servicemen and servicewomen place themselves to 
protect our freedoms.  See The Army Values, ARMY.MIL FEATURES, https://www.army.mil/ 
values/ [https://perma.cc/8YCX-72GZ] (examining values of the army to analogize to 
values in our nation’s places of employment). 
332 Id. 
333 See The Army Values, supra note 331 (discussing the Army core value of Respect). 
334 See Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Office of the General 
Counsel, to All Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers (Mar. 18, 2015), 
https://www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/general-counsel-memos 
[https://perma.cc/44PB-LHZG] (stating broadly that a work rule may violate Section 7 even 
if it can be construed as prohibiting lawful concerted activities). 
335 See The Army Values, supra note 331 (providing the key values of the Army).  See also 
Aristotle, A&E TELEVISION NETWORKS (June 8 2017), https://www.biography.com/people/ 
aristotle-9188415 [https://perma.cc/NN3G-ZDKK] (discussing the history of Aristotle and 
his eventual influence on Western philosophy).  The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, 
along with Socrates and Plato, initiated these underpinnings of western philosophy. Id.  
Aristotle, born circa 384 B.C. in Stagira, Greece, enrolled in Plato’s Academy when he was 
age 17.  Id.  In 338, he began tutoring Alexander the Great.  Id.  In 335, Aristotle established 
his own school, the Lyceum, in Athens, where he studied, taught, and wrote during the 
remainder of his life.  Id.  Aristotle died in 322 B.C., in Chalcis.  Id. 
336 J.A. SMITH & W.D. ROSS, THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, 1045a, at 8–10 (Claredon Press 1908, 
Volume VIII) (“[T]he whole is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the totality is something 
besides the parts.”). 
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to accomplish an organization’s larger purpose.337  Everyone must be 
guided to work together for the common good. This consideration is 
particularly important in today’s seemingly narcissistic culture of “Me 
first” attitudes and expectations of instant gratification.338  To the extent 
that many workers in today’s society are disinclined to be selfless or team 
oriented, rules and regulations are paramount to preserving order in the 
workplace and achieving company goals.339  This is not a convenience for 
an employer; it is a necessity.  
VI.  CONCLUSION  
The NLRB must discontinue its intrusion into the domain of 
employers to guide and protect their employees with proper rules of 
conduct.  The Board must recognize that companies exist for a purpose 
whether it be for the provision of quality healthcare, the manufacture of 
widgets, or anything in between.  It is more than safe to assume that no 
company has ever been ever created for the purpose of mistreating and 
abusing the very workers it has hired into the organization and placed on 
the payroll.  Rather, the safe assumption is that the vast majority of 
companies seek the most qualified workers for the available positions, 
orient and train them, inform them of the pertinent rules and policies, and 
then provide fair compensation while encouraging their growth as a 
quality employee.  That effort is severely hindered when an employer is 
unable to institute and enforce necessary rules to guide its workers. 
While there should be a presumption of lawful conduct on the part of 
employers, it is understood that there will always be some unscrupulous 
employers that will mistreat workers and infringe on their Section 7 rights.  
This is where the NLRB should be required to engage in the same type of 
analyses that are employed by lawyers and judges to first understand the 
true contest and meaning of a rule or a policy, using canons of statutory 
                                                
337 See, e.g., Ethan Pendleton, The Importance of Obeying the Rules and Regulations in the 
Workplace, CHRON http://smallbusiness.chron.com/importance-obeying-rules-regulations-
workplace-18690.html [https://perma.cc/Y2TL-HCBR] (supporting the author’s assertion 
that rules and regulations are necessary in the workplace).  
338 See Carrie A. Moore, The Me, Me, Me, Generation: Have Youths in America Brought into 
‘entitlement’ mentality?, DESERET NEWS (Oct. 18, 2008), http://www.deseretnews.com/ 
article/705256091/The-me-me-me-generation.html [https://perma.cc/F8RX-64JZ] 
(discussing how the “me first” mentality is a trait of many CEOs of failed companies). 
339 See Rafati, What Steve Jobs Taught Executives About Hiring, FORTUNE INSIDERS (June 9, 
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/09/shahrzad-rafati-keeping-your-best-employees/ 
[http://perma.cc/YEZ6-L72Z].  It is true that the late Steve Jobs, former CEO of Apple, said, 
“it doesn’t make sense to hire smart people and tell them what to do; we hire smart people 
so they can tell us what to do.”  Id.  Yet, that option is not always possible for employers, 
rendering the need for rules of conduct a reality which the NLRB must not ignore. 
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construction such as noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, as well as basic 
rules of contract construction which require that words be read in 
harmony with the rest of the provision’s language.  None of these methods 
will permit the NLRB to apply a tortured reading of plain language which 
is so overbroad that innocent and neutral rules are disallowed as unlawful 
on the basis of a predicted worst case scenario usage that will likely never 
materialize.  
Thereafter, if the NLRB remains concerned that certain language 
could be put to a bad use, it still must refrain from essentially cancelling 
the picnic because it sees one cloud on the horizon.  Instead, the NLRB 
should engage in the same evaluation which has proved effective in the 
federal courts.  One familiar method is the burden-shifting analysis 
whereby the employee first establishes a prima facie case of a Section 8(a) 
violation by showing that an adverse employment action has occurred 
due to the application of a company’s rule or policy, after which the 
company will have a burden of production to explain the legitimate and 
lawful reason for applying its rule.  At that point, the aggrieved employee 
will still be afforded an opportunity to demonstrate that the company’s 
explanation was a pretext or lie to cover up its unlawful behavior.  Like 
courts, the NLRB should only be empowered to take remedial action when 
there is a proven violation of Section 7 rights and not merely because the 
NLRB has unilaterally concluded that a Section 8(a) violation has occurred 
based upon its overbroad interpretation of a neutral and necessary rule.  
As mentioned in this article, some courts are presently questioning the 
continued usefulness of the burden-shifting method, and are gravitating 
toward a totality of the circumstances approach.  While that would also 
be appropriate, the point is that some type of evaluation is warranted, 
instead of a finding that rules are unlawful just because the NLRB feels 
that an unknown employee at some still to be determined time would read 
a rule in such a liberal fashion that the inclination to talk about working 
conditions would be affected.  The NLRB has taken to putting out fires 
before they start, and its zeal has likely caused harm to many of the very 
workers it seeks to protect because those employees must exist in a 
workplace where the bullies and harassers cannot be controlled by rules 
and policies which prohibit their behavior.  
The NLRB’s approach has become akin to a permanent injunction 
through which it can force an employer to cease and desist using 
workplace behavior rules or policies based solely on an ominous forecast.  
It is imprudent and unnecessary for the NLRB to use this fix it before it is 
broken approach, because even if a rule or policy is eventually applied in 
manner that amounts to a Section 8(a) violation, the resulting harm is not 
irreparable. 
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A case-by-case approach by the NLRB, rather than one based upon an 
asserted foreknowledge that an unspecified employee’s Section 7 rights 
would be inhibited by a basic rule of conduct, is necessary to balance the 
interests of all who are affected by the application of the NLRA.  This will 
still afford complete protection to employees in the rare circumstance 
when an employer misuses a valid workplace conduct rule.  Meanwhile, 
quality employers will no longer need to fear the NLRB’s precipitous 
enforcement of the language of Section 7 of the NLRA, and will be free to 
operate with necessary order while providing a safe and secure work 
environment for employees who are working together as one.  This will 
be good for all workers, the economy, and our country as a whole. 
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